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**Institutional Conditions for Presidential
Success in the Legislative Arena:
The Electoral Connection in Brazilian Politics**

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Abstract:

How can legislators' behaviour be explained within Congress? Why do legislators cooperate with the president's preferences? What are the main institutional instruments the executive has to secure cooperation? This article intends to answer those questions by examining the determinants of legislators' voting behaviour inside the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. In order to do so, it takes into account two institutional aspects: the role of decentralized electoral rules which give rise to political parties extremely fragile in the electoral arena; and the effect of a huge centralized internal decision-making process within Congress, in which the president holds agenda-setting and constitutional powers of legislating associated to its capacity to distribute of political and financial resources to legislators based on their performance.

Resumo

Como explicar os votos dos parlamentares no plenário da Câmara dos Deputados em relação às preferências do executivo? O que faz com que os parlamentares cooperem com os interesses do presidente em algumas votações, mas não em outras? Qual o papel que os partidos políticos exercem no comportamento dos parlamentares fora e dentro do Congresso? Quais os principais instrumentos que o executivo dispõe para estimular comportamentos cooperativos dos parlamentares? Para responder estas perguntas, é desenvolvido e aplicado um modelo com o objetivo de estimar os determinantes do voto dos parlamentares no plenário das Câmaras dos Deputados. Alguns aspectos são particularmente enfocados: os instrumentos e habilidades que o presidente utiliza para incentivar comportamentos cooperativos dos parlamentares na Câmara; o papel desempenhado pelos partidos políticos e seus respectivos líderes no padrão de votação dos Deputados; as influências e constrangimentos institucionais proporcionados pelas regras eleitorais bem como pelas regras internas do Congresso; e a influência das principais bases eleitorais dos parlamentares. É demonstrado que, em consonância com os poderes do presidente de legislar e de controlar a agenda do congresso, os parlamentares, principalmente os que pertencem aos partidos da coalizão de governo, cooperam com o presidente seguindo as orientações de seus líderes partidários como uma estratégia de acesso a benefícios políticos e financeiros que são controlados pelo executivo, benefícios estes que podem ser usados na arena eleitoral com o objetivo de maximizar suas chances de sobrevivência política. É também demonstrado que são estes parlamentares que apresentam maiores chances de serem reeleitos, fechando assim o ciclo da conexão eleitoral no Brasil.

Introduction

The great majority of authors who analyse the Brazilian political system, especially its electoral rules and political parties, usually affirm that they provide many obstacles preventing the executive from having its agenda approved, thus creating huge governability problems. First of all, the presence of an open-list and proportional representation allows the citizens to select candidates rather than parties. It thus follows that they base their selections on candidates' personal qualities, their activities, and personal records. This offers a strong incentive for a candidate to develop direct links with his/her constituency groups rather than to mediate such relations through political parties. Thus, the personification of the vote is highly influenced by the way that citizens elect the individual legislator (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Haggard 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Ames 1995a, 1995b, 2001).

By contrast, a second group of authors (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999, 1997, 1996, 1995; Pereira and Mueller 2000; Meneguello 1998) has strongly questioned this consensus. Rather than stressing the decentralized effect of electoral rules, they emphasize institutional rules and structures that organize the legislative process itself. In other words, the set of rules and internal procedures that define the level of centralization in terms of prerogatives of initiating the decision-making process (agenda setting) are in the hands of the deputies or the parties and/or the executive. Actually, this second variant attempts to explain how institutional variables internal to the decision making process (the distribution of power inside Congress) and the institutional legislative powers held by the president work as key variables in the definition of the legislator's behaviour.

The main argument of this paper, however, is that that the Brazilian political system can be characterized neither as a purely decentralized nor as a purely concentrated system. In fact, it condenses those two different and antagonistic forces at the same time. While, on the one hand, some features such as electoral rules, a multiparty system, and federalism act as decentralizing

the political system, on the other hand, the internal rules of the decision-making process inside the Congress, the constitutional powers of the president, and its capacity of distributing selectively political and financial resources act towards centralizing it. In fact, the electoral rules provide incentives for politicians to behave individually while the internal rules of the Congress, the president's power to legislate, and the centralization of benefits by the president, render legislator behaviour extremely dependent on loyalty to the party and presidential preferences.

Actually, it is the result of the combination of electoral and internal rules that will define the relative costs of the legislator's voting behaviour. Therefore, the combination of these two forces – the electoral and internal rules of Congress – provides paradoxical incentives for both personal and party votes at the same time. Summarizing, on the one hand, in terms of legislator's selection, the deputy has incentives to behave personally. On the other, in terms of agenda-setting power, the deputy has incentives to behave according to the party leader or, in the last instance, according to the president's interests (see Chart 1). In this case, the dynamic equilibrium point that can be reached can change from one issue to another. Precisely, it chiefly depends on the capacity of the president and his/her party leaders in offering the appropriate incentives -- political and economic benefits – able to provide the best electoral returns to individual legislators.

This paper thus intends to take into account both forces, the electoral rules and the internal rules of the Congress, in order to demonstrate the main influences and determinants of legislator behaviour in terms of cooperation or not with presidential preferences in the recent Brazilian politics. This dynamic combination of institutional rules is the key for understanding how it is possible for weak political parties in the electoral arena and strong political parties inside Congress to co-exist.

The next section will briefly discuss the incentives to the personalization of legislators' behaviour and the decentralization of the political system that originates from the electoral rules. The third section demonstrates that even with

all the incentives to behave personally, the Brazilian legislators have systematically and consistently followed their party leaders' indications. As an attempt to explain this apparently paradoxical behaviour, the fourth section analyses, using a multivariate model, the institutional components responsible for the centralization of the distribution of political and financial benefits by the executive that leads to party legislative behaviour. Finally, the fifth section tests and demonstrates how the electoral connection works in Brazil suggesting that party behaviour is mostly a consequence of the selective way the executive rewards legislators' performance.

Incentives for weakening political parties in Brazil

This section argues that the incentives of the party systems and political actors are significantly influenced by the rules that regulate electoral competition. In particular, politicians' actions are directly affected by the incentives established in three manners: namely, the selection, the campaign, and the electoral processes. While some electoral rules demand an intrinsic loyalty to the party, others clearly motivate individual behaviour.

Various scholars[1] have defended the idea that if parties control candidate selection, political campaigns and the order of the ballot, the individual legislators must act according to the party positions and leader indication; if they do not act accordingly, their political careers will be threatened. On the other hand, if candidate selection and election campaign are perceived as dependent on personal records and individual initiatives, then legislators will have few incentives to behave according to the party indication, and, therefore, their parties are likely to be less cohesive and less disciplined. Thus, there will further be a link between personal votes and weak parties; between party vote and strong parties.

The electoral system can be classified in many different ways. In general terms, however, it is possible to say that the literature classifies the electoral system using two structural features that orient strategic voting: seat allocation and district magnitude. According to the principle of seat allocations, it is useful to distinguish between two polar cases. The first, a 'winner-takes-all', the system

awards all seats at stake to the party or candidate winning the most votes. Second, the 'proportional representation' system allocates legislative seats to parties in proportion to the percentage of total votes that the parties receive.

The district magnitude simply quantifies the number of seats that are to be filled in a given electoral district. In the U.S., for instance, the district magnitude equals one in all House districts, while in Israel the whole country serves as the electoral district. In Brazil, each different state is a single, at large, multi-member district. The number of seats or district magnitude range from 8, in less populated states, to 70 in the largest one, São Paulo. According to Nicolau (1996, 55), although the Brazilian mean magnitude is considered high at about 19, it is possible to conceive the *effective magnitude* as a median instead. He says that if just the positive votes (candidates and party) are divided by the real electoral quotient, the mean magnitude drops from 19 to 15.

It is possible to conclude that, following Sartory's terminology, systems are *strong* when they provide substantial electoral incentives to coalesce and *feeble* when they provide little or no such incentives. Systems with low district magnitudes or winner-takes-all seat allocation formulas are strong; systems with high district magnitudes and proportional representation seat allocation are feeble. Strong systems put a meaningful upper bound on the number of parties, while feeble ones do not. The winner-takes-all seat allocation caps the number of parties at two, regardless of district magnitude (Duverger 1954; Palfrey 1989; Cox 1994). Proportional allocations in districts of magnitude M cap the number of parties at M+1 (Cox 1994; Cox and Shugart 1996).

Electoral systems also have an important influence on the nature of party systems, affecting, in particular, the number of parties, factions, and individual politicians that will compete for a position. Several authors argue that systems that pit members of the same party against one another in direct electoral competition tend to promote the creation of factions. Several features stimulate such intra-party electoral competition. One practice most frequently pointed out by the literature is that of the "open" list in systems of proportional representation, as seen in Brazil. The voters may either vote according to party labels or cast

their electoral tickets directly for individual candidates. Most voters, however, choose the second option (about 90%). This system, in real terms, has stimulated voters to cast their ballot for an individual candidate. Voters thus directly determine which of a party's candidates will represent them in the legislature. Hence, those candidates face substantial incentives to compete with one another and as a consequence, to form factions in an effort to differentiate themselves from their intra-party competitors.

That is, open-list systems provide incentives for voters to base their choice of electoral support on the candidate's own personal qualities and activities, rather than on those of his or her party. Thus, if winning nomination and election depends mostly on individual initiative, then politicians have less incentive to obey the positions of the party leadership (Carey and Shugart 1995). The party organization is likely to be looser, less cohesive, and less disciplined.

In sum, it is possible to draw two important conclusions from the literature. First, systems that use more proportional methods of seat allocation and have larger district magnitudes are weaker, while systems that rather rely on a winner-takes-all basis and have low district magnitude are stronger. Second, systems that promote intra-party competition for votes and seats provide more candidate – or faction – based electoral politics, while systems that disallow or hinder intra-party competition for votes and seats promote more party-oriented elections.

Therefore, the Brazilian institutional electoral system, the mechanism of candidate selection, and some party rules create incentives for individualistic and anti-party behaviour. The Brazilian electoral system helps to explain the individualistic behaviour of politicians in the electoral arena and has contributed to the weak institutionalisation of the party system.

However, the Brazilian system magnifies this tendency. The rules allow unlimited re-election, and parties are obligated to renominate incumbents desiring re-election, no matter how they voted in the previous legislative section (Ames 2001). This is the so-called *candidato nato,* whereby incumbent federal deputies have the right to be on the ballot for the same position in the next

election. This, of course, frees politicians from party leaders' influence, and as a consequence, undermines the notion of leadership.

The process of candidate selection is also very much affected by the federalism in Brazil. By federalism, I mean the extensive influence of local politics, mayors and state governors as powerful forces with significant autonomy *vis à vis* the federal government. The control exercised by state governor and local politicians over the action of legislators is widely known about. A direct correlation can be drawn between this influence of local leaders and the selection of legislative candidates. At core is the premise that the selection occurs basically at the state or local level. One result is the creation of decentralized state parties rather than of national centralized parties. In order to guarantee his nomination, a candidate needs to build political alliances at the local and state levels, decreasing the impact of party politics and at the same time orienting the legislator's behaviour to ward pork barrel politics in order to attend to local clienteles.

Strong federalism also affects the president's aim of achieving a safe majority in the Congress. In order to ensure his preferred policies, it is not enough for the president to build a national coalition based on a party's representation in Congress. The president also needs to consider the satisfaction of regional demands, especially from governors. This, of course, forces the president to take into consideration state and regional interests when making cabinet and other high-ranking appointments.

Legislative behaviour inside the Chamber of Deputies

Although Brazil has no institutional provisions for nonincremental changes in its political system, it is possible to identify a clear disciplined party behaviour inside the Chamber of Deputies in the opposite direction of what has been portrayed in the majority of the literature. In addition, the political parties in Brazil have consistently presented a high ideological profile even in the presence of a large number of parties and the persistent shifting of party label.

Concerning the pattern of party coalitions, Limongi and Figueiredo (1995) suggest the presence of three ideological blocks in the Brazilian Congress: right,

centre, and left. According to these authors, from 1988 to 1994 the parties that make up these blocks have consistently voted in similar ways. They also point out that out of the 221 cases that were analysed, 143 (64.7%) were labelled as ideologically consistent; that is, when the blocks sharply voted against each other; 18 (8.1%) were considered less consistent; that is, when the party's leaders allow the party's members to vote in accordance with their own principles and/or interests; and only 54 (24.5%) of voting events were really considered ideologically non-consistent.

Moreover, Limongi and Figueiredo affirm that it is common for the party members to follow their leader's indication - only in 33 cases from a total of 1317 votes did legislators vote against the party line. The data shows that, during this period, the party with the lowest internal cohesion – the PMDB saw 85% of its members vote in the same way. Such findings imply a very high level of internal discipline. They also affirm that the constant turnover of the members of right-wing parties, along with the continual changes of party labels do not directly affect the deputies' behaviour in plenary.

Contrary to general expectation, parties' voting on the plenary assembly is, in actual fact, foreseeable. It is quite possible to accurately predict the results of plenary voting as legislators are expected to follow the party leader's indication. In general, since the left-wing parties have obtained around 20% of the seats, instances of less predictable voting principally occur when the centre-right coalition is divided, and mainly when the PMDB and PFL are on opposite sides (Figueiredo and Limongi 1999). It follows, then, that, when this coalition is maintained, as has occurred in the majority of cases, the parties forming the government coalition are also those with the most effective governing power.

According to Nicolau (2000), who studied the performance of parties from 1995 to 1998, "what grasps our attention in the Brazilian case is the variation. It is possible to say that PC do B and PT present a high rate of party discipline similar to the most disciplined European parties; the PFL, PSDB, PDT and PTB look like American parties or less disciplined European parties; and the PMDB,

PPB and PL present level of discipline below the average of the European or even American parties." (See Table 1)

It is possible to infer thus that the widespread perception that the Brazilian political parties have a fragmented style of discipline is a faulty one. The level of discipline between the eight effective parties (as well as that of small parties in Congress) is far from being too low, as is claimed in the traditional literature. Indeed, the disciplined vote is the 'rule of the game.' The literature makes this mistake as it analyses the parties without differentiating between the level of discipline and coalition among them, and because it does not take into account the legislative work occurring inside the Congress itself.

Nevertheless, to recognize that legislators' behaviour within the Chamber has been more foreseeable according to party larder's indication does not mean disregard for the fact that the Brazilian electoral system and the mechanism of candidate selection create incentives for individualistic and anti-party behaviour. So, the Brazilian electoral system helps to explicate the patters of politicians' individualistic behaviour in the electoral arena and also contributes to a weak institutionalisation of the party system.

The main puzzle that must be investigated is as follows: why, when so many of the incentives within the electoral arena motivate the Brazilian legislators to act in accordance with their own personal preferences, do they instead chose to follow their party leader's indication? The key for answering this question, I believe, is located in the institutional dynamic of the decision-making process inside of Congress, which gives large dominance to the executive.

Executive dominance in the legislative arena

Roughly speaking, there exist three main institutional mechanisms which the executive makes use of to enforce its preferences in the legislative arena. First is the president's constitutional power of legislating (decree power, veto power, exclusive right to initiate new legislation in certain areas such as budget and administrative laws, prerogative to establish urgency time limits for voting procedures and bills). Second is the centralization of the decision-making

process by party leaders within the Congress. Third is the executive capacity of centralizing the distribution of political and financial resources to legislators. This paper will mainly focus on this last component since the first two others have been discussed at length by Figueiredo and Limongi (1999) and Pereira and Mueller (2000).

The institutional power held by the executive, on the one hand, and the centralized decision making system in the legislature, on the other, impose restrictive agendas and limit legislators' role in policy outcome. With all these institutional devices, it is no surprise to conclude that the executive has largely dominated the legislative process in Brazil. The President is thus empowered to block the legislation he does not like as well as to enforce his own legislative priorities.

At first sight it would appear that the Brazilian presidency is endowed with so much power that governing would be relatively easy. But this impression is misleading. Although the constitutional powers attributed to the presidency are impressive, this does not mean that Brazilian presidents are strong in all regards. In fact, despite the inherent centralization of the decision making process delegated by Congress, presidents are still subject to the scrutiny of the congressional body; i.e., presidents need congressional support to enact ordinary legislation and constitutional amendments through congress' institutional series of steps including committees, the floor, directing table, and so on. Bear in mind that the Brazilian electoral system, discussed earlier, by combining open-list proportional representation, high magnitude electoral districts, and candidate selection at the level of the state, provides enough incentives for legislators to behave personally.

However, despite the presence of a decentralized electoral system and a fragmented party system, the optimal electoral strategy in Brazil has not been concentrated in the personal vote, but rather in its opposite, the party vote. At first glance, this assertion seems paradoxical, given the premise that legislators are subject to electoral incentives to behave individually. Indeed, Brazilian legislators vote according to their party leader's indication in order to accumulate

greater benefits in the congressional arena and thus to strengthen their electoral probability of political survival in the local sphere.

One of the decisive elements to understand how this intricate system works, especially the influence of the executive on legislators' behaviour, is to look more carefully at the budgetary decision-making process. As mentioned before, in Brazil it is the executive that has constitutional exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget. Although the congressional legislators have the right to amend the bill that is introduced by the president, they can only do so if those amendments are compatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive as well as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may not authorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. Usually individual legislator's amendments to the annual budget are oriented to benefit the municipalities where they received the most votes in the previous election as a strategy of maximizing electoral returns.[2]

However, it is the executive who is entitled to determine which amendment will really be executed, as the execution is contingent on the availability of resources in the national treasury. In other words, the executive uses great flexibility and discretion concerning which amendment will or will not be executed, which, of course, puts the executive in a very privileged position to negotiate with legislators. Frequently, the executive's strategy is to wait until the last month of the fiscal year (December) to execute budget amendments as a way of pressuring deputies to behave according to it's preferences in order to be in a position to reward faithful legislators or to punish those who fail to support the president during the year.[3]

Strengthening the centralization of the budgetary process even more, the current government decided, at the beginning of its first term, to craft a very important institutional change, which provided greater influence of the executive over legislators. The Cardoso's government decided to centralize legislators' demands and the distribution of executive's assets through the creation of a special System of Legislative Performance, called SIAL (Decree Nº 1.403, 21 February 1995). With this institutional change, the government inaugurated a

new and more efficient way of controlling legislators demands and performance at the same time.

According to Eduardo Graeff, Executive Assistant of the Ministry of Political Issues, "at the beginning of the government, we had noted the absence of an institutional mechanism capable of controlling legislators' demands. It was not unusual to see several legislators, many of them unfaithful to the government, requesting benefits from different government agencies and Ministries oriented to assist their electoral constituencies. We decided, thus, to take upon ourselves the control of this situation centralizing all legislators' demands at the SIAL. This centralized system allows us to have a perfect picture of what legislators have requested as well as to what extent the executive has really answered their demands."[4] In other words, the SIAL works by balancing pressures between legislators' demands and their voting behaviour in Congress. It helps to rationalize and control the executive's budget expenditure, decreasing the costs of bribing legislators to support the executive by allowing it to answer the demands of faithful legislators while avoiding wasting resources on unfaithful ones.

Moreover, the process of appointing public jobs in the government's second and third ranks is largely known as one of the most important negotiating tools among political parties who support the executive in Congress. Unfortunately, data are almost categorically unavailable. This information has been treated by both the executive as well as by the legislators as a truly "black box." Furthermore, when such information does come into the public sphere it is usually fragmented, partial, and the media tends to consider with suspicion, or even immoral.

Although each party leader or individual member of Congress has information concerning his or her particular appointment to a specific public job, they do not have access to the entire set of political appointments in the public sector. Only the executive – more precisely, the President's General Secretary – maintains this data in a systematic fashion. Unfortunately, for my purposes, I was not allowed access to this data. Despite the lack of systematized data, there are

enough evidences in the media that indicate the importance of appointing public jobs as a decisive instrument of bargaining between executive and legislators. In even a quick browsing through the largest Brazilian newspaper, *Folha de São Paulo*, it is possible to find a lot of examples. This at least suggests a positive correlation between the appointment of public jobs by politicians and votes favourable to the executive on the floor of Chamber of Deputies.[5]

Multivariate model of legislative behaviour

In order to estimate the determinants of individual legislator decision on whether or not to cooperate with executive's preferences as well as to test if the executive has exchanged the execution of legislators' demands by political support in Congress, a set of multivariate logit regressions were run having as dependent variable the roll call vote of each legislator regarding the president's position in 325 roll calls in the floor of the Chamber of Deputies from 1995 to 1998.[6] However, it is important to clarify some proceedings on data before moving on to the regression itself.

According to the Minister of Political Issues, Luiz Carlos Santos, "the most important difficulty faced by the executive with Congress was not convincing individual legislators to vote with the president's preferences. The greatest problem was indeed to accomplish the needed quorum to reach the majority in order to approve the presidential agenda, especially on constitutional amendments bills that need the qualified majority of 3/5 of votes."[7]

Implicit in this statement is that individual legislators behave strategically in choosing to absent themselves from the floor rather than showing up to vote against presidential initiatives, which could have costly repercussion, especially from the executive. Therefore, such behaviour cannot be interpreted as a simple absence or abstention. It is important to take into account the government's position in order to understand the real meaning of a legislator's behaviour.

In other words, when the government position is "yes" on a given roll call, there is just one behaviour for the president, that is "yes," and three behaviours against the president's position, "no," "absence," or "abstention." However, when the president's position is "no" on a given issue, exactly the opposite takes place.

This means that to vote in favour of the president the individual legislator has three options, "no," "abstention," or "absence," and, therefore, just one behaviour against the president's position, "yes." (See Chart 2) This assumption has important consequences for the model, especially in regard to the dependent variable, cooperate or not with the president. In that sense, instead of having four voting different behaviours, the individual legislator's decision was reduced to two options: either vote for or against the president's position, because it is directly connected with that of the government.

Second, in order to make comparisons between consensual and controversial votes, I have sorted the roll calls according to the degree of agreement reached in each group of votes on the floor. Thus, we have groups of votes around 50, 60, 70-74, 75-79, 80, and 90% corresponding to each broad bloc of votes, as in "PEC" and or "Other" votes. Along with these procedures, I was able to test twenty-four groups of roll calls through econometric regressions: twelve on "PEC" and twelve "Other" votes.[8] Although I ran all variables that take part of the model simultaneously to measure the effectiveness of each variable on legislator's voting behaviour, I have organized the outcome of the regressions in two separate tables, one for "PEC" and one for "Other" roll calls.

The following independent variables were included in the model:

1) The mean of the execution by the government of all individual amendments at the state level – that is, including the allocation to all municipalities in the entire electoral district – that each legislator approved in the annual budget from 1995 to 1998 (*Budget*). The hypothesis asserts that those legislators who vote more consistently with the executive will present a greater mean rate of the execution of their amendments, while the inverse is true for those legislators who have presented lesser presidential support.

2) The amount of money that was effectively executed by the government from individual amendments of each legislator oriented to benefit the local municipality where he/she obtained larger portion of his/her votes during the election of 1994 (*Pork*). In other words, how much money each legislator in fact

delivered in his/her main electoral base. I also expect a positive coefficient to this variable;

3) The total number of amendments of each legislator approved in the annual budget law, but not executed by the government, oriented to the main electoral base of support in the 1994 election (*Nº amendments*). This variable does not necessarily intimate that the legislators have been successful in executing the bill but rather, that they are just claiming credit for presenting and approving bills on the annual budget, which can benefit their constituencies, including Mayors, State Deputies, and local politicians. In short, this variable tries to capture the effect of legislator dissatisfaction with the executive by not executing their amendments already approved in the budget law. For this reason, a negative coefficient for this variable is expected, indicating thus that legislators would be less frequently supportive to presidential preferences when they notice that the executive does not provide enough incentives.

4) Also considered in the model is the influenced of belonging to the presidential coalition on legislators' vote. Thus the variable *Coalition* represents those legislators who belong to the parliamentary base of a president's support. The value of 0 is assumed if the legislator does not take part of the president's coalition and 1 if she does. It is expected that those legislators who belong to the government coalition will present greater probability of voting according to president's interests.

5) Further included in the model is the number of times each legislator has changed from one political party to another (*Nº Change*). This number varies from zero, for deputies who did not switch political parties, to four, for deputies who most change political parties.[9] The importance of including such variable in the model is that it helps to investigate the common view that it is very difficult for the president to rely on legislators who frequently change political parties. Following the literature's expectation, the model does concur that, as a rule, the president can count less on the deputy who changes political party affiliation. Therefore, the hypothesis defended is that the coefficient to the variable "number of changes of political party" should be negative. In other

words, the greater the number of changes, the less incidences of support for the president's preferences.

6) In addition to consider the 'number of party change,' the model also takes into account the direction of the change. In other words, it was distinguished between the deputies who changed party in the direction of the coalition that supports the president in the Chamber. Thus, *Exit Coalition* indicates the deputies who changed parties and move to the opposition. *Enter Coalition* indicates those who switched to parties in the coalition.[10] This is a better measure than the simple count of changes in party because it also indicates the ideological direction of the change. Hence it also measures the influence of presidential support in the election for the Chamber. I expect *exit coalition* to have a negative impact on presidential support in the Chamber and *enter coalition* to have a positive effect.

7) Finally, also included in the model is a set of variables that aim to estimate the effect of the participation and performance of legislators within the Chamber in their voting behaviour. Thus, the variable *Directing Table* shows if the individual legislator belongs to the most important institutional body in the process of conducting and deciding the congressional agenda. Those legislators definitively have an agenda-setting power. It will assume the value of 1 if the individual legislator has been a member of the *Mesa Diretora* and 0 if he/she has not. It is expected that those legislators who occupy these positions have to be very faithful to executive interests since they will decide what and when issues will or will not be voted on. As a consequence, they present a higher probability of voting for president's preferences. Following the same logic and expectation, the formal hierarchical position of the Deputy in Standing committees (*Committee*) and special committees (*Special committee*) were also included in the model.

8) As for controlling variables I included in the model three dummy variables (*left, centre, right*) which represent the ideological distribution of legislators taking as parameter their political party affiliation in 1998. A positive

correlation is expected for the legislators located at the centre and right since they belong to the presidential coalition in Congress, and negative otherwise.[11]

Analysis of the econometric tests

First of all, as it possible to see from the tables 1 and 2,[12] the great majority of the model's hypotheses were confirmed by the tests, especially on PEC roll calls.

Does belonging to the government's coalition affect on the individual legislator's voting behaviour?

According to regressions, the answer to this question is yes. This affirmative answer is very strong both on PEC and "Other" votes, particularly, in those roll calls where the government's position is yes; in other words, when the executive really needs his/her parliamentary support base in Congress. Remember that it is the government's responsibility to provide a majority of votes when the government's position is yes. This is especially true on PEC roll calls which require a qualified three-fifth majority votes to approve a constitutional amendment. So, to be part of the government coalition does have an impact when those two previous conditions are present, since this variable was systematically significant both on PEC (six times) and Other (five times) roll calls despite the level of controversy.

On the other hand, when the government's position is "no," this variable loses the its capacity to explain legislators' voting behaviour because those who belong to the presidential coalition can simply not show up or even abstain from voting. This behaviour, consequently, directly benefits presidential preferences. As follows, it is the opposition's responsibility to provide a sufficient number of votes in order to reject the government's preferences. In this situation, this variable was statistically significant just three times on PEC votes and two times on Other votes. Yet, it still bears the model's hypothesis because it was statistically significant on controversial PEC roll calls, suggesting once again that on controversial issues the executive could count on his legislators' votes.

Concerning variables that aimed to estimate the effect of deciding to enter or to exit the government's coalition, they fully endorsed the model's predictions. For instance, the forty-eight deputies who decided to become government legislators presented a high level of presidential support. Out of twelve groups of PEC roll calls, this variable was statistically significant in ten and nine groups of other votes, assuring a positive correlation between "enter coalition" and in voting for the president.

At the same time, the fifteen deputies who decided to leave the government's coalition presented a solid pattern of not cooperating with presidential preferences, especially on PEC votes. This assertion can be validated by the regression result which reveals negative but still statistically significant coefficients suggesting a negative correlation between the "exit coalition" variable and the legislators' level of support for the president with favourable voting behaviour. It is important to recognize that although the "exit coalition" variable presented negative coefficients in all groups of votes, it was statistically significant in just four groups of Other roll calls, when the government's position was yes. This means that when the president demands support from those legislators, he faces greater difficulties in counting on them, as was also predicted in the model.

These findings suggest that during its first term, the current Brazilian government earned an even greater political consistency with regard to the individual legislator's voting behaviour by attracting faithful legislators and expelling unfaithful ones. At least it is an indication that party change does not necessarily imply more difficulties for presidential governability as some authors advocate (Ames, 1999; Samuels 1999; among others). In fact, it will mostly depend on the direction of change.

Do party switches create trouble for the president?

According to the result of the econometric tests, there is no clear way to interpret this. The first point to be noted from the tables is that this is a poor variable in terms of its capacity to explain legislator behaviour. In fact, party switching was only statistically significant three times on PEC votes, and four

times on Other votes. Actually, the test provides mixed interpretations. If, on the one hand, switching political parties shows a positive correlation on PEC votes, it also shows a negative correlation on Other votes. Briefly, on PEC votes it is expected, according to the econometric result, that the greater the number of party change, the larger the probability of legislator cooperation with the president. On Other votes, however, the greater the number of party changes, the larger the probability of non-cooperation.

It is therefore possible to infer that party change does not create trouble for the president on proposals of constitutional amendments, but it does on regular legislation. Nonetheless, it is important to be cautious with this assertion. Aside from being a poor variable in regards to both groups of votes, when the result of the variable "number of party change" significantly predicts a negative correlation it does so on consensual roll calls. So, it is not a big problem for the executive since on these consensual votes the president can count on other party fashion legislators, including the opposition.

For this reason we can assume that the frequent exchange of party labels, mainly by conservative legislators, has not undermined the presidential capacity of counting on his legislative support in Congress, as has been advocated by some authors. Thus, to change political parties does not matter in terms of legislator behaviour. Indeed, legislators continue to present the same pattern of voting inside Congress. We can also assume, supporting Figueredo and Limongis's argument, that the turnover of the members of right-wing parties and the continual changes of labels do not directly affect the deputies' behaviour in plenary.

Are the Directing Table, Standing Committees and Special Committees strategic places for the government?

The logistic regression also ratified that it is in the executive's interest to place worthy legislators in the institutional sphere with the right to define the Congress agenda as well as to decide which and how many committees will analyse bills. In other words, the tests fully approved the hypothesis that predicts a higher probability of cooperation between the executive and the legislators who

occupy the highest hierarchical positions on the Chamber's Directing Table. This variable was statistically significant six times on PEC votes and four times on Other votes.

In an upsetting result of the logistic regression, the Standing and Special committees top positions variables presented a poor performance in terms of statistical significance. The top hierarchical position in the Standing committees variable was statistically significant only two times on PEC and not one single on Other votes. The hierarchy on Special committees was even worse regarding its statistical performance. In none of group of PEC and just one in Other votes was this variable statistically significant. Therefore, the model's hypotheses were not ratified. We can conclude, thus, that the executive is not so concerned about the committees' hierarchical positions since legislators who occupy those positions did not manifest their voting behaviour consistently in favour of the president's preferences.

I am not sure, however, if we should be satisfied with this conclusion. Pereira and Mueller (2000) have already referred to clear evidence provided by sophisticated tests, which emphasize the existence of informational gains obtained by the Chamber's floor – and by the executive – when the committees are representative of the executive's preferences. They have also demonstrated that there are strong indications that the executive strategically acts in Congress substituting unfaithful members by other trust worthier ones in order to guarantee the victories of his/her preferences. This assumption was also confirmed by the answers of several legislators who said that their choice of committees was negotiated or even imposed by the party leaders. Hence, it becomes difficult to explain executive's concern for appointing favourable members, if there were no relevance attached to having them in the committee.

These different outcomes can be associated with the very unstable features or trends typical in the Brazilian committee organization. The Brazilian committees present a very high degree of variation concerning their composition; even from one meeting to the next. I presume that those variables were organized in such a way that they did not appropriately capture these features.

Therefore, I assume for now that these variables must be carefully analysed in further studies and researches.

Can execution of legislators' budget amendments buy their cooperation?

The result of the regression persuasively ratifies the model's hypothesis that presupposes a positive correlation between presidential execution of legislators' individual amendments on the annual budget and voting for president on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. However, it is important to point out that this hypothesis was most consistent on PEC roll calls (ten times among twelve groups of votes), which means that the incentives provided by this variable on legislators' behaviour mainly works when the government needs a qualified majority to approve a constitutional amendment. Therefore, the direct presidential influence rewarding legislators who vote most for the president's interests and punishing those who vote less for the president really occurs in the Brazilian Congress.

In some groups of "Other" roll calls, this hypothesis was also ratified, although less strongly than on PEC votes. This variable was statistically significant, especially on issues with high and intermediate levels of controversy and when the government's position was "yes" (see Table 3). Therefore, in order to cooperate with the president in controversial roll calls as well as on PEC votes, legislators must be recompensed – and something the president strategically carried out on target issues.

To what extent is favouring legislators' electoral bases related to cooperation with the president?

In order to answer that question, the logistic regression tested two variables. The first was the number of individual amendments that legislators introduced on the annual budget (but did not necessarily execute), which were designated to benefit the municipality where they received the most votes in the previous election. The second was the total amount of money of individual legislators' amendments that was in fact executed by the president in the most important electoral base – usually referred to as pork barrel politics. The model

predicts a negative correlation for the former and a positive correlation for the latter.

The econometric tests also strongly confirmed both hypotheses. Tables 1 and 2 definitively demonstrate compelling evidence that legislators who have, in fact, most often delivered pork barrel politics amply repaid the president with their political support. This variable was statistically significant in ten groups of PEC votes and seven of Other votes, most of the time with 1% of statistical confidence. In addition, the variable Pork almost always displays positive coefficients, attesting to the accuracy of the model's hypothesis.

As for the variable "*Nº amendments*," it has also followed the model's prediction. The amount of individual amendments approved by Congress in the budget law does not guarantee legislator's cooperation with the president. On the contrary, the econometric test demonstrates that if the legislator's budget amendments are not executed, he/she expresses his/her dissatisfaction through voting consistently against the president's position. This argument can be attested by looking at tables 1 and 2 that show this variable statistically significant in eight groups of PEC votes and in three groups of Other votes always presenting negative coefficients mainly on controversial issues. Consequently, the logistic regression firmly indicates that the legislators' concern about delivering policies to an important electoral base of votes is one of the most important determinants of a legislator's voting behaviour in terms of cooperation or not with presidential preferences on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies.

These results allow me to infer how strong is the room for executive manoeuvre to constrain legislative behaviour in Brazil. As we expect, the effect of the executive's discretionary power concerning the budget execution is more evident on the legislators who belong to political parties that build the presidential coalition within Congress. Both variables (*centre* and *right*) are statistically significant and positive. That is, they present greater likelihood do support presidential preferences and as a consequence greater chances of having their individual amendments executed.

Conclusion: The Brazilian electoral connection

So far, the main concern of this paper has been to evaluate a variety of factors capable of exerting influences on legislators' voting behaviour in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. I have demonstrated that legislators inside the Chamber do behave according to the wishes of their party leader. They do this in order to gain access to the political and financial benefits controlled by the executive, and which they can in turn use in the electoral arena to maximize their chances and strategies of political survival. Among these strategies, re-election is one of the most important.

At this juncture, I must clarify what I mean by the Brazilian electoral connection. Actually, to explain the Brazilian electoral connection it is important to understand how the legislator's party and coalition behaviour and pork barrel politics can co-exist in the same political system. However, we have still to estimate the extent to which this could be a rational behaviour by really brings their re-election about. Otherwise stated, it is decisive to know if this behaviour inside Congress produces benefits that can be translated into votes in the electoral arena. The answer to the following two questions will help us to solve this puzzle.

Is there a contradiction between pork barrel and party behaviour? In other words, is there a contradiction between the existence of weak political parties in the electoral arena and strong political parties inside Congress?

As was stated before, the key for understanding this apparently contradictory political system is to simultaneously take into account the presence of paradoxical institutional incentives for personal and party behaviour. If, on one hand, the electoral system provides incentives for politicians to behave individually, the internal rules of the Congress and the presidential power of legislating on the other make legislator behaviour extremely dependent on loyalty to the party (see once again chart1).

Besides centralizing the decision-making processes inside Congress and allocating huge executive powers of legislating, the Brazilian political system also allows the president to control the distribution and execution of a lot of political

and financial assets. This provides colossal electoral consequences for those that have the chance of exploiting them appropriately.

What this paper has so far demonstrated is that the executive has largely used the distribution of those assets to reward faithful legislators by approving their local demands and punishing legislators who do not follow his preferences by denying access to them.

What I am now trying to demonstrate is what the great majority of Brazilian legislators must do in order to yield to two central yet, opposing pressures. As follows, legislators must satisfy constituencies' demands in order to have conditions to survive politically. Simultaneously, the legislators are compelled to follow their party leader indication and thus to gain access to political and financial benefits, so that they can use them, in turn, to satisfy constituencies' demands in order to have electoral returns. That is exactly how the cycle I have called here the Brazilian electoral connection is sealed.

Therefore, there are no contradictions at all between the strong party behaviour and simultaneous strong use of pork barrel politics. On the contrary, as we have seen, the Brazilian political system, mainly condensed by a feeble electoral system and centralized internal rules of Congress, affords equilibrium. However, in this case, the dynamic equilibrium point can change from one issue to the next. Precisely, it depends chiefly on the capacity of the president and his party leaders to offer the appropriate incentives – political and financial benefits – capable to provide electoral returns to individual legislators.

Up to now, we are able to affirm that the legislators who mostly achieve success in delivering pork barrel politics present a pattern of voting behaviour inside Congress consistently favouring presidential preferences. Nevertheless, to what extent has this legislator's strategy - of being reliable for presidential preferences oriented to maximize the execution of constituency's demands – been supplying electoral returns?

In order to answer this complex question I have run a final logistic regression, taking as the dependent variable a dummy that represents legislators who ran for re-election in the legislative election of 1998. This variable is

assigned the value of 1 if the individual legislator was reelected, and 0 if otherwise. In other words, through this regression I want to estimate if the legislator's strategy of exchanging presidential support (party behaviour) for pork barrel during the four years of this legislature really brought in electoral returns.

Of the 606 legislators in my sample, including effective and substitutes, 446 (73.59%) decided to be candidates for re-election in 1998; 49 (8.08%) to be candidates for other electoral positions, such as State Governors, Senator, and so on; and 160 (26.40%) decided not to run for any electoral post. Of the 446 candidates who ran for re-election, 286 (64.41%) were reelected and 160 (35.87%) were not successful in their aims. It might be a coincidence or too earlier for definitive conclusions, but it was the first legislative election in the history of Brazilian democracy where the number of reelected legislators surpassed the number of new legislators, suggesting a kind of electoral reward by voters.

To confirm that it was not just a coincidence I decided to go ahead with the regression analysis of the dependent variable: that of being reelected or not. The key explanatory variable of this test, of course, is amount money, in the form of individual legislator's amendments on the budget from 1995 to 1998 oriented to benefits towards the municipality where he/she received most votes in the previous election, which the president concretely executed. The model predicts a positive correlation between re-election and pork barrel. In other words, the greater the percentage of pork barrel delivered, the greater the probability of being reelected.

Besides "*pork*," the model also takes into account the variable "*Nº amendments*," which represents the number of individual amendments approved by each legislator, but not necessarily executed by the government, on the annual budget oriented to the municipality where the legislator obtained most votes. It is expected that the logistic regression shows a negative coefficient for this variable indicating thus that for the legislators, just claiming credit does not lead to recognition by their constituency.

In addition to pork barrel and the number of amendments approved but not executed, I have added another variable, "*Spends98*," which represents the total amount of money each legislator claims to have spent during his/her electoral campaign of 1998, as per their official declaration to the Electoral Court. It is widely believed that the larger the amount of money spent, the greater will be the probability of legislators' re-election.[13]

The model also intends to estimate the effect of legislators voting behaviour within Chamber on the likelihood of re-election. "*Presvote*" indicates how many times each individual legislator voted with the president during the entire legislature, from 1995 to 1998. This variable works like an indicator of presidential loyalty. Hence, it is expected that the more legislators vote for the president, the more they increase their probability of re-election, since the president has enjoyed consistent popular approval during his whole first term.

Although it is necessary to recognize that this model needs a better specification[14] (as well as the inclusion of other important variables so that we can understand the complex set of reasons which have influenced the process of re-election) it is possible to say that this model affords us insightful and interesting findings. Besides that, the regression presented a very percentage level of prediction, about 80%. This actually illustrates a sign of reliability of the regression equation.

The key result in the logistic analysis is the fact that the coefficient on "Pork" is positive and significant (see Table 4) confirming the hypothesis. This means that, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the amount of individual legislator amendments certainly executed by the president, the higher will be the probability of legislator's re-election.

[Table 4 here]

Another important finding of the test was the confirmation of the prediction concerning the variable "*Nº amendments*." Its coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This result indicates that the greater the number of individual legislator amendments approved (but not executed) by the president, the lesser will be the probability that this legislator will be reelected. That is

probably the reason why these legislators also present a low probability of voting with the president, since they are not usually rewarded.

Those two previous results represent powerful evidence that the legislators' strategy of following presidential preferences and their party leader indication in order to have access to political and financial benefits that they could exploit in electoral arena, does guarantee electoral returns. In a word, the Brazilian electoral connection really works.

The regression also indicates that spending money during electoral campaigning also has implications regarding re-election. This variable shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient, however at 10% level. For this reason, as it was demonstrated by Pereira and Renno (2001), this result must be interpreted with caution since the size of the standard deviation is much greater than the mean of electoral spending among both the group of reelected and non-reelected legislators. This clearly shows that the dispersion around the mean is enormous for both groups and that the mean is strongly affected by outliers that spend much more than average. The median, a measure not so sensible to outliers, for both groups is much smaller than the mean, indicating that most incumbents spend less than the average amount. Another problem with this variable is the number of missing cases and the biases introduced by them. There is information available for 98% of the reelected incumbents and for 82% of those who were not reelected. Therefore, any conclusive inference based on this data is not free of bias.

An impressive surprise provided by the regression was the result of the variable voting with the president (*Presvote*). Although its coefficient is positive, this variable was not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no correlation between a legislator's behaviour inside the Chamber and his/her probability of being reelected. Furthermore, this result suggests that the legislators' constituencies do not directly constrain their representatives' behaviour inside Congress. Actually, they are even more concerned with the capacity of their representatives of delivering policies oriented to benefits to their local municipalities since they reward politicians based not on their national

performance in terms of legislator's voting or party records, but based mainly on this legislator's personal endowments. This leads us to infer that, in the electoral arena, the great majority of voters do not mind about their representative's performance.

Therefore, when legislators are deciding how they should vote on the floor of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, they are less inclined to take into consideration their constituency's position since it provides few benefits for their future political careers. What they are really strategically concerned with is how to access the benefits controlled by party leaders and by the executive. This is why political parties are so strong inside the Brazilian Congress, but at the same time, they are so weak on the electoral arena. Consequently, there is also no contradiction at all between expecting legislators to vote according to their party leader's indications inside Congress and expecting them to behave personally, seeking pork barrel benefits, in the electoral arena.

Endnotes

[1] Mathew Shugart and Scott Mainwaring (1997, 421), for instance, affirm that electoral rules explain party discipline: "the extent to which members of a given party's congressional delegation vote as a bloc or, on the other hand, vote independently of one another, can be expected to be strongly related to three basic features of the rules under which they become candidates and are elected. These three features are- control of candidates selection, control of the order in which members are elected from a party list, and pooling of votes among a party's candidates - all strongly affect the degree of influence leaders have over the rank-and-file members."

[2] Actually, the rules regarding amendment have varied considerably in the past years. In 1992 and 1993 only individual legislators could propose amendments. In 1993 collective amendments by 'state bloc' (*bancadas estaduais*) and other committees were permitted. For the annual budgets of 1994 and 1995 four types of amendments were accepted: standing committees, political parties, state bloc and legislators. Since 1995, under Resolution nº 2/95-CN, amendments can be made by standing committees, regional bloc, state bloc, and by individual legislators. Until 1993, there was no limit regarding the number of amendments that each legislator could make to the annual budget. Resolution nº 1 of 02/06/93 restricted the number of amendments for each legislator to fifty. This was an attempt to rationalize the process by giving priority to collective amendments thus reducing the large number of disputes among legislators to ensure approval of their amendments. In 1995, Resolution nº 2/95-CN further reduced the number of amendments to 20 and set a ceiling of R$ 1.5 millions as the total amount of amendments per legislator. Recently, legislators decided to increase the value of this quota to R$ 2 millions.

[3] For instance, in the last two fiscal years, more than 2/3 (66.87% in 1999 and 66.04% in 2000) of the execution of total investments, where are located legislators' amendments, was executed in December (Pereira and Mueller, 2001).

[4] Interview realized at Eduardo Graeff's office in Brasília on September 1997.

[5] A good example of bargaining was the vote shift of the Deputy Hermes Parcianello (PMDB) during the Social Security Reform. On 6 March 1996, the Deputy Parcianello voted against the Social Security bill, placing himself in opposition to the presidential and his party leader's preference. He then made a public declaration, calling himself a coalition dissident. However, during the second voting round – to approve a

constitutional amendment, two victorious rounds are necessary in both houses – the Deputy Parcianello changed his position voting in accordance with president's indication. According to *Folha de São Paulo*, this vote shift allowed the Deputy to appoint the Regional Superintendent of the RFFSA, Federal Railroad, in the state of *Paraná*, the Deputy's electoral base of support. Asked for explaining his vote alteration, the Deputy Parcianello said to the newspaper: "one of the problems was the RFSSA Superintendence." (*Folha de São Paulo*, 26 March 1996, p.1-6) The newspapers offer plenty of such; however a last and curious example of bargaining can be found in the beginning of Cardoso's first term. The PPB's party leader, Deputy Raul Belém, left a meeting, which concern government composition, saying to the newspaper, "the President Cardoso said that we should indicate more than one name in order to give him options. Instead of Ministries, we decided for appointing second and third ranks public positions because we prefer twenty bikes rather than one Mercedes." (*Folha de São Paulo*, 19 January 1995, p.1-7)

[6] 164 roll calls on constitutional amendment proposals – PEC and 161 other votes.

[7] Interview realized at Luiz Carlos Santos' office in Brasília on September 1997.

[8] It is important to initially note that I have tested with different methods in order to detect the presence of multicollinearity and also to determine its severity. I followed the "Simple Correlation among Regressors" technique to measure the severity of multicollinearity among the variables. According to this technique, if the correlation coefficient between the values of two regressors is greater than 0.8 or 0.9, then multicollinearity is a serious problem. I did not find one unique correlation coefficient greater than 0.9. However, in order to take away all doubts, I also applied the "Variance Inflation Factor" test. Values of inflation factor greater than 1.0 imply that the variable in question is not orthogonal to the rest and hence multicollinearity is present in some degree. Some authors, as an indication of severe multicollinearity, use a value of 5.0 or more. Once again, no variable presented a value greater than 5.0.

[9] From 1985 to 1998 there were 804 party switches in Brazil, which evolved 688 legislators including effective and substitutes. Roughly, 30% of the elected deputies changed party labels during the last four legislatures (Melo 1999). Especially regarding the period here studied, 159 incumbents decided to switch parties; 125 once, 26 twice, 7 three times, and just one legislator changed four times.

[10] Precisely, 48 legislators decided to move to parties that belong to presidential coalition and 15 opted for leaving the government coalition.

[11] As Left, Center, and Right are dummy variables, I had to remove one of them (in this case, Left) in order to avoid multicollinearity. In fact when this procedure is made the variables that remain in the model are run in regard to the left out variable.

[12] These two tables summarize the main findings of the tests. However, all tests as well as the dataset are available upon request.

[13] The exact impact of campaign finance on elections is far from consensual in the US. Jacobson's (1990) thesis is that the more an incumbent spends, the lower are his chances of getting reelected. On the other hand, the chances of the challenger increase when he/she is well funded. Money spent by the incumbent is a sign of vulnerability. Green, Krasno, and Cowden (1994) question this argument and point out that the timing of the donation is a central factor. Incumbents who get early money scare away high quality challengers. In addition, the power of reaction of the incumbent, meaning his ability of raising funds in distinct moments of the race, is higher than that of challengers. Thus, incumbents spend money to avoid the growth of opposition in their districts (Thomas 1989). According to Samuels (2000), reelected candidates spend more than those who lose, indicating that money buys votes in Brazil. However, Samuels bases his conclusion on a simple measure of central tendency, without considering the dispersion of this variable.

[14] For a more sophisticated approach about the determinants of re-election and political career's choices in Brazil see Pereira and Renno 2001, and Leoni, Pereira and Renno, 2001.

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Chart 1: Electoral System vs. Internal Rules of the Congress

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────┐
                    │ Brazilian Political System  │
                    │ Different kinds of Incentives│
                    └─────────────────────────────┘
            ┌───────────────────┴──────────────────────────┐
┌───────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│   Electoral System    │          │    Internal Rules of Congress    │
│                       │          │ Legislative Power of the President│
│                       │          │ Centralization of Benefits       │
│                       │          │          Distribution            │
└───────────────────────┘          └──────────────────────────────────┘
            │                                   │
┌───────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│    Open-List  +       │          │           Centralized            │
│ Proportional          │          │         Agenda-Setting           │
│ Representation        │          │                                  │
└───────────────────────┘          └──────────────────────────────────┘
            │                                   │
┌───────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│   High Autonomy        │          │    High Executive and           │
│ of Individual          │          │ Majority Coalition Control       │
│ Legislators            │          │ over Legislators' Behaviour      │
└───────────────────────┘          └──────────────────────────────────┘
            │                                   │
┌───────────────────────┐          ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│   Incentives for      │- - - - - │       Incentives for             │
│   Personal Vote       │          │        Party Vote                │
└───────────────────────┘          └──────────────────────────────────┘
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Chart 2: Distribution of Legislator's Vote Options according to President's Position

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                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │   Government     │
                    │   Position       │
                    └─────────────────┘
            ┌───────────────┴────────────────┐
         ┌──────┐                          ┌──────┐
         │ Yes  │                          │ No   │
         └──────┘                          └──────┘
        ┌────┴─────┐                     ┌────┴──────┐
     ┌─────┐   ┌─────────┐          ┌─────┐      ┌─────────┐
     │ For │   │ Against │          │ For │      │ Against │
     └─────┘   └─────────┘          └─────┘      └─────────┘
        │     ┌────┼──────┐      ┌────┼──────┐        │
     ┌─────┐┌────┐┌──────┐┌────────┐┌────┐┌────────┐┌────────┐┌─────┐
     │ Yes ││ No ││Abstain││Absence ││ No ││Abstain ││Absence ││ Yes │
     └─────┘└────┘└──────┘└────────┘└────┘└────────┘└────────┘└─────┘
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
Table 1: Party Discipline Rate
(% of roll call votes that deputies followed party leadership position)

Party	1995		1996		1997		1998		Total
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	
PC do B	97.9	63	98.4	64	99.6	69	99.3	47	98.8
PT	98.5	64	99.2	68	98.0	69	99.1	47	98.7
PFL	95.1	62	89.6	65	94.3	69	95.1	47	93.4
PDT	89.9	57	91.8	64	95.3	69	90.7	47	92.1
PSDB	90.7	63	91.9	66	92.8	69	90.7	47	91.6
PSB	81.9	57	90.2	58	96.3	55	97.2	47	91.0
PTB	90.3	63	87.8	64	89.3	61	84.9	43	88.3
PPR/PPB	92.1	61	86.6	63	80.9	65	69.6	47	83.1
PMDB	84.1	55	81.3	64	80.4	68	72.9	46	80.1
PL	92.9	50	79.3	59	66.9	24	57.9	29	77.9

Source: Brazilian Chamber of Deputies

Table 2: Summary of the Logistic Estimation of legislator's Voting Behaviour on PEC Roll Calls

Controversy	Gov Position	Nº Roll Call		Constant	Coalition	Enter Coalition	Exit Coalition	Nº Change	Centre	Right	Directing Table	Committee	Special Committee	Budget	Nº Amendments	Pork	Likelihood	Nº Observation	% Prediction
50%	Yes	2	Coeff	-4.061	2.449	2.501	-0.822	0.808	1.170	1.406	0.822	0.121	0.706	0.224	-0.589	0.731	-361.34	747	75.5
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.101	0.597	0.012	0.002	0.175	0.078	0.299	0.000	0.012	0.010			
	No	10	Coeff	-0.476	0.213	0.729	-0.334	0.492	0.734	1.089	0.904	-0.116	0.820	0.504	-0.366	0.180	-2295.45	3752	68.6
			p-value	0.000	0.229	0.000	0.126	0.441	0.000	0.000	0.970	0.658	0.770	0.029	0.000	0.098			
60%	Yes	17	Coeff	-1.311	1.032	1.009	-0.576	0.139	0.530	0.591	0.532	0.393	-0.103	0.767	-0.159	0.176	-3986.17	6381	66.69
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.765	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.048	0.618	0.000	0.023	0.031			
	No	12	Coeff	-0.995	1.026	1.281	-0.584	0.916	0.977	0.993	0.496	-0.149	0.843	0.164	-0.365	0.289	-2090.13	4502	81.8
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.016	0.218	0.000	0.000	0.076	0.601	0.791	0.000	0.000	0.019			
70-74%	Yes	26	Coeff	-1.719	1.112	1.410	-0.765	0.594	1.203	1.308	0.207	0.271	0.683	0.118	-0.681	0.257	-5080.63	9721	76.81
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.178	0.000	0.000	0.193	0.137	0.972	0.000	0.282	0.001			
	No	27	Coeff	-0.487	0.759	1.168	-0.787	0.140	0.811	0.922	0.123	-0.944	0.148	0.134	-0.249	0.689	-4321.23	10140	80.75
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.641	0.522	0.000	0.000	0.000			
75-79%	Yes	22	Coeff	-1.589	1.157	1.225	-0.759	0.151	1.333	1.374	0.307	0.275	-0.219	0.561	-0.129	0.408	-4261.25	8221	77.77
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.083	0.989	0.916	0.001	0.059	0.000			
	No	7	Coeff	-0.235	0.956	0.917	-1.106	0.226	0.590	0.940	0.729	0.142	0.169	0.122	-0.294	0.620	-1018.74	2634	82.99
			p-value	0.137	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.066	0.030	0.001	0.121	0.741	0.732	0.001	0.030	0.001			
80%	Yes	9	Coeff	-0.448	0.948	0.949	-0.860	-0.491	0.604	0.653	0.852	-0.124	-0.201	0.492	-0.709	0.331	-1803.28	3389	75.59
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.504	0.002	0.001	0.008	0.683	0.544	0.066	0.496	0.010			
	No	14	Coeff	0.842	0.337	0.215	-0.943	0.170	1.032	1.396	0.803	-0.239	-0.157	0.816	-0.212	0.434	-1466.99	5242	90.7
			p-value	0.000	0.201	0.350	0.002	0.119	0.000	0.000	0.058	0.949	0.714	0.016	0.064	0.008			
90%	Yes	16	Coeff	1.427	0.369	0.265	-0.112	-0.594	-0.309	-0.245	0.168	0.339	-0.275	-0.158	-0.118	0.165	-2952.94	6015	80.59
			p-value	0.000	0.018	0.096	0.957	0.290	0.051	0.111	0.459	0.888	0.274	0.453	0.156	0.100			

				Constant	Coalition	Enter Coalition	Exit Coalition	Nº Change	Centre	Right	Directing Table	Committee	Special Committee	Budget	Nº Amendments	Pork	Likelihood	Nº Observation	% Prediction
	No	4	Coeff	1.125	0.452	0.720	-0.811	-0.141	1.088	1.344	0.998	0.817	0.183	0.792	-0.807	-0.286	-377.92	1491	**92.08**
			p-value	0.000	0.367	0.100	0.132	0.434	0.029	0.007	0.244	0.302	0.841	0.241	0.735	0.350			
Total	Yes	92			6	6	4	1	6	5	3	2	0	5	3	5			
Total	No	74			3	4	4	2	6	6	3	0	0	5	5	5			
Total		164			9	10	8	3	12	11	6	2	0	10	8	10			

Level of Significance: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*

Table 3: Summary of the Logistic Estimation of legislator's Voting Behaviour on Other Roll Calls

Controversy	Gov. Position	Nº Roll Call		Constant	Coalition	Enter Coalition	Exit Coalition	Nº Change	Centre	Right	Directing Table	Committee	Special Committee	Budget	Nº Amendments	Pork	Likelihood	Nº Observation	% Prediction
50%	Yes	11	Coeff	-1.143	0.426	0.763	-0.937	-0.380	-0.477	0.353	0.855	-0.128	0.285	0.363	-0.170	0.269	-2941.03	4488	**61.38**
			p-value	0.000	0.007	0.000	0.635	0.476	0.761	0.020	0.670	0.573	0.904	0.071	0.041	0.004			
	No	12	Coeff	0.111	0.104	0.421	0.215	0.890	0.331	0.524	0.420	-0.210	0.253	0.663	-0.113	0.169	-2772.7	4570	**68.68**
			p-value	0.991	0.525	0.010	0.992	0.131	0.046	0.001	0.069	0.374	0.322	0.002	0.181	0.090			
60%	Yes	10	Coeff	-0.953	0.803	0.754	-0.237	-0.320	-0.308	-0.213	0.275	-0.671	0.500	0.612	0.218	0.959	-2514.45	3719	**56.84**
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.260	0.578	0.856	0.197	0.203	0.783	0.051	0.005	0.805	0.344			
	No	15	Coeff	0.177	0.317	0.543	-0.234	0.829	0.420	0.439	0.684	-0.809	0.247	0.307	-0.953	0.305	-3162.5	5608	**73.41**
			p-value	0.061	0.037	0.000	0.223	0.881	0.007	0.004	0.004	0.721	0.319	0.125	0.234	0.001			
70-74%	Yes	27	Coeff	-1.610	1.049	1.311	-0.269	-0.567	0.834	0.894	0.124	0.234	-0.221	0.634	0.328	0.300	-5955.05	9679	**67.58**
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.045	0.130	0.000	0.000	0.377	0.147	0.181	0.000	0.956	0.000			
	No	17	Coeff	-0.695	0.436	1.206	-0.306	0.981	1.800	1.885	0.196	0.187	0.484	0.131	-0.228	0.273	-2278.04	5973	**84.36**
			p-value	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.237	0.894	0.000	0.000	0.432	0.512	0.153	0.000	0.014	0.025			
75-79%	Yes	26	Coeff	-0.912	0.865	1.011	-0.526	-0.879	0.410	0.463	0.501	-0.879	-0.108	0.512	-0.681	0.266	-6172.15	9705	**65.77**
			p-value	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.018	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.580	0.519	0.000	0.233	0.000			
			Coeff	0.847	0.478	0.895	-0.551	0.707	0.313	0.373	0.158	-0.245	0.928	0.122	-0.490	0.709	-655.47	1872	**87.71**

	No	5	p-value	0.000	0.187	0.018	0.177	0.958	0.933	0.307	0.062	0.648	0.152	0.011	0.004	0.003			
80%	**Yes**	15	Coeff	-0.215	0.658	0.820	-0.300	-0.154	0.144	0.133	0.163	-0.253	-0.240	0.220	0.440	0.129	-3643.31	5588	**62.81**
			p-value	0.018	0.000	0.000	0.085	0.001	0.296	0.323	0.374	0.214	0.267	0.232	0.550	0.130			
	No	3	Coeff	0.345	0.319	0.431	0.266	0.226	0.856	0.435	-0.161	0.494	-0.990	-0.105	0.980	-0.543	-638.54	1123	**72.92**
			p-value	0.102	0.337	0.187	0.956	0.856	0.012	0.183	0.709	0.921	0.059	0.815	0.584	0.795			
90%	**Yes**	19	Coeff	0.843	0.153	0.130	-0.325	-0.171	-0.479	-0.117	-0.727	0.223	-0.240	-0.872	0.571	-0.183	-4334.69	7096	**69.57**
			p-value	0.000	0.226	0.301	0.037	0.000	0.707	0.344	0.659	0.245	0.233	0.609	0.410	0.816			
	No	1	Coeff	59.81	-27.23	-27.14		-0.85	-28.59	-28.29		0.90	-0.29	0.16	-0.80	-0.28	-25.06	373	**98.39**
			p-value	1.00	1.00	1.00		0.06	1.00	1.00		0.25	0.29	0.57	0.45	0.84			
Total	**Yes**	108			5	5	4	3	2	3	1	0	0	4	1	3			
Total	**No**	53			2	4	0	1	4	3	3	0	1	3	2	4			
Total		161			7	9	4	4	6	6	4	0	1	7	3	7			

Level of Significance: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*

Table 4: Logistic Estimation of Re-election of 1998

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	b/St.Er.	P[|Z|>z]	Mean of X
Characteristics in numerator of Probability [Y = 1]					
Constant	.8200679994	.54400376	1.507	.1317	
PORK	1.123893291	.49270973	2.281	**.0225**	.33083333
NEMENDA	-.7537403819E-01	.35539859E-01	-2.121	**.0339**	3.0312500
SPENDS98	.2087799722E-05	.12473569E-05	1.674	**.0942**	153785.71
PPRESVOTE	.2182740945	.68785255	.317	.7510	.75736315

Percentage of Prediction: 79.16%
Log likelihood: -129.2009
Number of Observations: 288