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**Consequences of Candidate Selection under Open-list electoral system: the
case of Brazil¹**

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¹ The empirical data used in this paper were obtained from the academic research "Political Parties: Organization, Recruitment and political representation" conducted at the Department of Social Sciences, Federal University of São Carlos, in the period 2007 to 2009 and was funded by FAPESP. Some of the theoretical discussion was developed from the research literature which was conducted in the Latin American Centre, University of Oxford in the second half of 2009, and was funded by the British Academy.

Consequences of Candidate Selection under Open-list electoral system: the case of Brazil²

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Abstract

The focus of this article will be on the consequences of the legislative candidate selection process for two aspects of the Brazilian political representation system. The first is the degree of intraparty inclusiveness. The second is the control of a party list by party leaders. Following the key concepts and methodology offered by some scholars, that demonstrate the centrality, determinants and consequences of candidate selection process in Europe, US and Latin America, I argue that in Brazil there is evidence that parties control the candidate selection in order to produce particular consequences in electoral competition and in the types of candidate selected and elected.

Key words: legislative candidate selection, political parties, intraparty democracy, electoral competition

I. Introduction

Since the mid-80s, with the return of democratic regimes to Latin America, a wide debate among scholars has been taking place concerning the institutional dimensions of democracy. However, recently, there is increasing concern about the micro-processes of democracy and, more importantly, the recognition that institutions alone do not provide a sufficient explanation for political behavior³. In this

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³ In comparative politics, for example, Gunther & Diamond (2003) in which the authors develop a typology of new parties, one of the important findings was the identification of a variety of parties in the same country, which shows that the influence of institutional variables such as electoral systems in the organizational structure of the parties should be rethought. Other important evidence refers to the case of Brazil, where despite the proportional system with open lists, which theoretically would encourage individualistic behaviour to the detriment of the political party, the Workers' Party (PT) has produced a dynamic focus on party reputation (Samuels, 1999, Meneguello & Amaral, 2008), resulting in one of the most relevant organizational structures of Latin American. To these scholars, the choice of program performance, intra-party democracy, the organizational structure based on

sense, to understand the shape, quality of representation and the role of political parties in these new democracies, like Brazil, the candidate selection process for elected positions is gaining prominence (Jones, 1997, 2002; Mainwaring, 1991, 1999; Langston, 2001, 2006; De Luca et al, 2002; Siavelis, 2002; Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008; Freidenberg & Alcántara, 2009, Power & Mochel, 2009; Braga et al, 2009a, Braga, 2009b).

The centrality of candidate selection procedures for democracy has been demonstrated in the European and US literature (Duverger, 1959; Epstein, 1967; Seligman, 1967; Czudnowski, 1970 e 1972; Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Ware, 1996; Norris, 1996 e 1997; Katz, 2001; Pennings & Hazan, 2001; Lundell, 2004; Hazan & Rahat, 2006). As will be discussed below, the findings of these studies show that candidate selection is a crucial activity in the life of any political party because it is possible to identify who really decides and, therefore, who has control over access to political power. And it still has implications for the political representation in, operation, maintenance and governance of democratic regimes.

One important notion is that political parties can control the candidate selection process, in order to support their electoral performance, policy-related, *office-seeking* or other purposes. It is certainly an idea that is worth investigating in a new democracy such as Brazil. If parties can control, even partly, the process of candidate selection, then there should be evidence of this in the procedures adopted for the selection process, in the organization of the list of candidates and in the types of candidate (and therefore legislator) selected.

It is my contention in this paper that, in Brazil, the evidence that parties can control candidate selection in order to produce some particular consequences in electoral competition and political representation dynamics is strong. In particular, three sets of factors will be analyzed in this paper, which all suggest that such control is very important for the nature of political parties. These factors are: the degree of internal democracy when we classify the main dimension of methods of candidate selection: the selectorate; the electoral behavior of those in the party who undertakes the task of candidate selection and organize the party list within procedures laid down by party rules and conventions; and the social type of

intense activity of affiliated structures by recruitment waterproof and particularly through the creation of several penalties and commitments of logic of collective action in the electoral arena and in government, largely explain the organizational profile of the PT in comparison to other party experiences in Brazil.

candidates selected and elected for each party has resulted in plural composition of the Chambers of Deputies.

The paper will focus on the selection of candidates for Chamber of Deputies in the 2006 elections, conducted by the major Brazilian political parties⁴: Progressive Party (PP), Democratic (DEM), Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) and Workers Party (PT). The assumption will be made that parties, in an attempt to reduce the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the election for Chamber of Deputies in Brazil and, thereby, increasing the chances of electoral success, will give attention to, among other things: who will select the candidates; who and how many candidates will be selected, the criteria used for the formation of the party list (the gender, generational, occupational and regional characteristics of candidates; representatives of certain interests; candidates with particular political skills).

The paper will begin with an overview of the literature on candidate selection in general, pointing out the conceptual scope used to investigate the centrality of the candidate selection process for the role of political parties in democracy and the types of consequences for the distribution of power within the party, for the degree of internal democracy, for the electoral performance and for the social types of candidate selected and elected. The third section will identify the electoral and Party Law devices that regulate this process to verify the degree to which the process is legally regulated or privately controlled by the parties themselves and will discuss the degrees of internal democracy when we classify the main dimension of methods of candidate selection: *the selectorate*. The fourth section will evaluate the strategic electoral behavior of the selectorate in the organization of the party list within procedures laid down by legislation, party rules and conventions. The last section will reveal how the candidate selection process has affected the representation of various social and economic segments of the Chambers of Deputies.

II. Consequences of Candidate Selection: considerations theoretical-methodological

⁴ Due to methodological reasons and the large number of nominal parties in Brazil, with 29 parties registered with the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), parties with greater parliamentary representation were selected, i.e., those with more than 5% of the total seats in the Chamber of Deputies. .

The centrality of candidate selection in democratic politics has to be identified for several scholars. To Katz (2001:278) this process is considered one of the central functions is defining political party in the contemporary democracies. In his words “This is true not only in the sense that selection of candidates to contest elections is one of the functions that separates parties from other organizations that may try to influence electoral outcomes and governmental decisions, but also in the sense that the candidates it nominates play an important role in defining what the party is”.

To Katz two analytical categories – “*candidates as persons*” and “*candidacies as roles or positions*” - serve at least to identify three interrelated functions within political parties as organizations in the contemporary democracies. Firstly is that the party’s candidate constitutes its public face in elections. More specifically, he comments that “Collectively, they manifest the demographic, geographic and ideological dimensions of the party”.

Secondly, he claims that “candidates are one of recruitment pools, and candidacy is one of the main recruitment routes”, for membership in the face of the party that Katz and Mair (1993) identified as the “party in public office”.

In my view, two distinctions are important. One is that *selection* and *election* are two phases of political recruitment, as indicated by Seligman (1961), Gallagher (1988) and by Norris (1997). Another is that political recruitment is distinct from the study of political elites. Czudnowski’s definition (1972:155) is that “The study of political recruitment inquires into the processes through which individuals or groups of individuals are inducted into active political roles”. To this scholar political-elite studies refer to the holders of influential positions in politics or to the social strata from which they have been recruited most frequently while recruitment studies are concerned with the social and political processes through which such positions have been attained. The purpose of recruitment studies, therefore, is to investigate the development of political careers. To Czudnowski the relevance of these studies is that “recruitment patterns can explain certain characteristics in the orientations and role performance of holders and other political elites”.

These different perspectives of analysis reveal that the investigation of the selection process of candidates is a type of political phenomenon that needs a broad theoretical scope to identify its consequences and implications. The case of Brazilian party’s organizers travelled paths that sought to account for the historical process began with the transition to democracy, democratization and institutionalization of

the political system. These diverse historical contexts influence the activities and development of both parties in the electoral arena and in government. Another important consideration considered when analyzing the process of selecting candidates in Brazil is to respect the changes in the sense of the social, economic and political complexity of Brazilian society. The development of the macrostructure has contributed to increased participation of actors drawn from the middle and popular segments in the process of representation and political governance, which in turn resulted in increased competitiveness among political party.

The third function, to Katz, is related to the individual candidate's links with their constituency and the social segments that may represent the political arena. He asserts: "While a party's candidates collectively contribute to its image as for example 'regional' or 'national' (the first function cited above), its individual candidates are part of the linkage between centre and particular elements of the periphery, both at the governmental and at the party-internal levels (Katz:279)".

In Brazil, due to the federal structure of the distribution of political power, the candidates for the Chamber of Deputies must follow the organizational logic of their mandates, but at the same time an applicant may present links to the various social and economic factors closer to the political party that the candidate is affiliated. Such links are in what Katz calls "psychological constituency" of a candidate (i.e., the portion of the electorate believes it will be represented by one candidate while the candidate also believes that the cause is). However, scholars have suggested that the Brazilian case of other institutional incentives, such as open list electoral system of proportional representation mechanism that is also contributing to the party system is highly focused on the individualistic behaviour of politicians, resulting in weak parties precisely because they have little or no involvement in the election of a deputy (Mainwaring, 1991.1999, Carey & Shugart (1995). The exception, according to Mainwaring, is the Workers' Party (PT). It's collective dynamic intra-party had contributed to the formation of a political party more centralized and organizationally robust. The opposition between individual reputation and party reputation will support these discussions which focus in the pathways along politicians win their parliament any seats. Which however, in my view, the institutional response to explain these different behaviours of partisan players, and even alleged weaknesses of parties in Brazil, needs to be reconsidered given that the electoral rules and guiding political

calculation of the leaders of political parties in the electoral process were the same for everyone?

We can conclude that in the contemporary democracies as systems of governance, as Katz sets out, candidate selection is a primordial function in all political parties because this process is a relevant means, through which the party in public office is reproduced itself, is a key arena for intraparty politics and reveals the public face of the party.

But what are the consequences of candidate selection indicated by scholars until now?

Most research has been conducted in response to this important question when the candidate selection process is analyzed as an independent variable and seeks to identify its effects.

For a long time the candidate selection process has affected the *distribution of power within the party* (Weber, 1922, Michels, 1949, Duverger, 1959, Henig, 1970, Ranney, 1981). Schattschneider (1942:64) noted that "(...) the nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party. This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party".

According to recent work, candidate selection procedures impact on the degree of internal democracy (Czudnowski, 1975; Bille, 2001, Hopkin, 2001, Pennings & Hazan, 2001 and Rahat & Hazan, 2001). Particularly three dimensions are very important. The first, relates to candidacy requirements. According to Rahat & Hazan, this refers to the party rules and/or laws governing who can become a candidate (selected). The second is the degree of centralization or decentralization that the candidate selection process takes. This decentralization can be territorial or functional. It is territorial when it happens at the national, regional and/or local level. It is valuable to investigate the relative importance of each in the selection of candidates. And it is functional when the party has the mechanism to ensure representation of groups such as trade unionists, women, youth, etc. A third dimension refers to the inclusiveness of selectorate, i.e., who within the party to selects the candidate. According to Rahat & Hazan (2006:369) "On a continuum of inclusiveness to exclusiveness, the selectorate is the most inclusive when the entire electorate has the right to participate in intraparty candidate selection. The selectorate is the most exclusive when there is a nominating entity of one leader".

This process is seen to affect the representation. In the context of established democracies, as demonstrated by Duverger, 1959; Key, 1964, and Gallagher (1988)

in any electoral context the candidate selection process restricts the electorate's choice, determining who may appear in the party list and therefore be elected. This is possible because, as Gallagher notes, a small "selectorate" is responsible for designating candidates in many countries. Pesonen (1968:28) showed that the selection process eliminates 99, 96% of candidates and the elector choose from 0,04%.

Other consequences relating to this aspect are that this process determines the types of candidate selected and, largely, elected. Gallagher's 1988, and Norris's 1993, 1996, 1997 finds show that candidate process affects the degree to which candidates represent significant social cleavages. Similarly, Katz (2001), and, in the context of newly democratizing politics as in Brazil, Rodrigues (2002) refers to demographic variables but also Marengo dos Santos (2000, 2004,2007) and Braga et al. 2009 indicate the type of prior political or professional experience, the linkage with party organizational and ideological identity. According to Power & Mochel's (2009:31) argument, one of central three intervening variables in the candidate selection process, in Brazil, is the social structure. They claim that "The uneven regional development of Brazil (Soares, 1967) means that politicians are routinely representing dramatically different social structures, with implications for both their style of representation and their accountability to civil society".

This process is found to affect the degree of electoral competition. Parties seek electoral success. The choice of candidates contributes to, or may detract from the chances of electoral success (Epstein, 1967; Roberts, 1999). Another relevant factor about the electoral consequences of this process is related to the strategic electoral behavior of the selectorate in the diverse institutional contexts (Carey & Shugart, 1995, Rahat & Hazan, 2006). According to some scholars the political behavior actor, in this case, is also influenced by electoral rules and informal procedures party. But as Siavelis & Morgenstern (2008:26) claim "The CS methods may undermine or reinforce the expected effects of electoral laws⁵.

⁵ Other work also provide that the type of candidate selection affects the responsiveness and accountability of parties,(Kerman:1997 and Pennings:1997), there are consequences for legislator behavior (Gallagher, 1988; Siavelis & Morgenstern),for legislative-executive relations (Gallagher et al, 2001; Pennings & Hazan, 2001; Rahat & Hazan, 2001, 2006) and for the policy making process (Pennings, 1998).

This paper will focus on the consequences of the legislative candidate selection process for the role of the political party in the political representation system. The principal question to be addressed is what evidence can be found concerning the power of party leaders in the control of the candidate selection process in Brazil and what the affects of this are in the political electoral competition?

III. Classifying candidate selection methods in Brazil: the degree of intra-party democracy

What evidence can be found concerning the power of party leaders to control the selection procedures and, therefore, the representativeness in Brazil?

To answer this question, first indicate the context of rules governing this process in Brazil. Then identify and classify according to the degree of inclusiveness, the procedure with the greatest impact on the shape of the party list resulting from the selection process. In the last part I examine what kind of consequence of each type of selector is on the profile and composition of the final list of candidates of each party, demonstrated by the degree of inclusion or exclusion of that process. For this, I analyze the party lists of the five parties in the 26 states of the elections for federal deputies from 1994 to 2006. The premise here is that the higher degree of inclusiveness of the membership in the decision-making the greater the intra-party democracy.

According to Braga (2008) the recruitment policy in Brazil is governed by rules, formal and informal procedures from both parties and the legal system of the country. In this institutional context we can classify the case in Brazil as a mixed one regarding the degree to which the process is legally regulated or controlled privately by the parties themselves. Particularly in relation to the selection process the electoral law establishes requirements for an individual to become a candidate at the minimum age (21 years to be congressional candidate), the nationality, a minimum education (illiterates may not be candidates but can vote); formation of the party list (stipulates the maximum number of candidates by party / coalition) and territorial bond (for a particular municipality of a single state) and party (citizen to be a candidate needs to be affiliated for at least one year to the respective party before the election). The last legal requirement is important because it reveals that Brazilian parties have a monopoly of access to applications for political office, that is, there are legal mechanisms in the Brazilian institutional environment that encourage party

reputation through the process of candidate selection⁶. Another device that moves in this direction is related to the fact that the party law stipulates that the parties themselves create the necessary rules to regulate the conduct of the choice of candidates in the party. Legally, therefore, the process studied here presents a mix of formal electoral rules and for the party but also statutory (defined by the statutes of each party) in respect of *who may be a candidate* in Brazilian society is about *who has the power to select candidates in the parties* or on the dynamics of the process of formalization of party lists⁷. It is therefore crucial dimensions of the selection process, according to Hazan & Rahat (2001, 2006).

To Hazan & Rahat (2001, 2006) methods for the selection of candidates can be classified according to the following dimensions: the selectorate, candidacy, voting versus decentralization and appointment. However, to look at the degree of intra-party democracy involving this process and the legal consequences these authors focus on the analysis of selectorate. They claim that "While each criterion used in the classification of candidate selection methods has a distinct influence on politics, it is the selectorate that exhibits the most significant and far-reaching consequences in general, and it is the inclusiveness versus exclusiveness of the selectorate that does so in particular "(Hazan & Rahat, 2006:369). And they explain that "On a continuum of exclusiveness to inclusiveness, the selectorate is the most even when the entire electorate has the right to participate in intraparty candidate selection. The selectorate is the most exclusive when there is a nominating entity of one leader. "

The main question about representativeness concerns the impact that the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate found in the parties and the overall characteristics of the list of party candidates. The hypothesis is that the more inclusive the selectorate, the more representative the selected candidates, and vice versa. To assess this hypothesis parties were classified as right (DEM, PP), center (PMDB, PSDB) and left (PT), following the criteria of the literature what on parties in Brazil.

According to Rodrigues (2002) and Marengo dos Santos & Serna's (2007) found

⁶ Another important legal provision in this discussion was the abolition in 1998 of cream application, i.e., the right (privilege) for legislation to guarantee the parliamentarians elected from party lists appear for the same position indefinitely.

⁷ The electoral law requires and provides deadlines for each party to hold its convention at the state level to form a party list. In each election year the meetings must be held between 10th to June 30th and the list of candidates must be registered by July 5 in the electoral justice.

they were investigating the composition of the legislative parties, when placed from right to left on the ideological scale, the political parties present differently in the social background of MPs and their patterns of political career. The principal argument here is that the more inclusive selectorates found in the left parties are more plural in the selection of the candidate because it's their social origin and organization shaped by different political groups (tendencies), more than filtered parties of the center and, even more than the right, the most exclusive.

Table 1 below shows selectors positions of the parties under the category of inclusiveness, checked in their party statutes. According to these documents, at all levels of contention (local, state and federal) are the party conventions (the PT is the meeting) that endorses the final list of candidates. Some of the members of these conventions at the state and federal representatives are chosen by the lower instances. To do this, no one affiliated to the public office should take six months (in the PP, PMDB and PSDB) and a years membership (in PT). Other party members have a seat guaranteed by the internal rules.

In the case of PP, DEM, PMDB and PSDB, in addition to elected delegates, also involved in the state convention the members of the directories in this sphere and affiliated with public office and elected (state and federal deputies, senators, presidents and leaders of the House and Senate, governors and President of the Republic) ⁸. Among these parties, the PP is the one with the more exclusive selectorate because its members elected office has cumulative voting, that is, a state representative may, for example, vote in state convention delegate as municipal, state deputy and leader of Legislative Assembly having the right to the three votes. The PT's conventional with the right voting needs to be elected to these meetings. Unlike other parties investigated, therefore, the PT's members of their directories and elected officials in each instance also participate in meetings, but have no voting rights.

Before the formalization of party lists for Congress, in the state conventions occur more informal processes where each party defines the amount and profile of future candidates who will represent the party in the election in each of the 26 federal units. Given their importance in controlling access to applications and, consequently,

⁸ These members, depending on their sphere of action, participate in more than one instance. In the case of a congressman, for example, may participate in convention at the three levels.

the composition of party representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, these actors are party to be examined in Table 1.

In the case of PP and some of the PFL/DEM party leaders (the presidents of state directories and/or members of elective offices in each state) indicate the names of prospective candidates and the list so formed is presented to the conventional. The PP is the most exclusive selector. In an intermediate level are located the two parties of the center. PMDB and the PSDB is the executive of their state directory that nominate who selects candidates. In this case the delegates of both parties participate by voting on the list at the state convention. In some state conventions the party members may be asked to express themselves through the vote, compared with other issues important to the strategies of the party during election campaigns. The PT is the more inclusive party, as shown in Table 1, including a larger number of militants of the party machine and its tendencies in its selection process. In this first phase the aspirants are indicated by the other party's affiliates in every state and then consulted if they want to be candidates. In the end a group of leaders organize the list of candidates.

Table 1 – Who (and how) chose the candidates to the Chamber of Deputies and the degree of inclusion

More Inclusion (voting system) ←		→ Less Inclusion (appointment system)		
Electorate (Open Internal)	Affiliates (Closed Internal)	Selection by the party's collegiate body	Selection by the party's Executive	Party Leader
		PT	PMDB PSDB	PP PFL

Source: own elaboration from the Election Code, Party Statutes and local observation in the parties conventions.

Views the position of the selectorate of each party in the continuum of inclusiveness, the next step is to verify the relationship of political behavior with the profile of each party list.

To assess this relationship it is important to consider that both of the *number* and the *backgrounds* of the candidates in the party list depends on the institutional aspects such as the size of the constituency, the maximum number has it come to nominate, the existence or not of the quota, the number of members who want to run and if the party does or not have coalitions. But these decisions also depend on organizational factors and structural distribution of power between the intra-party political group, such as the size of the party in the state, their integration and degree

of representation in the various segments and Social Movements, the degree of participation of interested groups, among others.

Under the legislation, in the race for the Chamber of Deputies, in most states, parties can compete with a list of candidates up to one and a half times the number of seats in the constituency. When parties compete in coalition that number increases to twice the amount. In the states they elect 20 representatives to each list with up to twice as many candidates and when the parties conclude coalitions, to two and a half times⁹. As for quotas, Brazil has since the 1998 elections, a quota of candidates by gender, in order to increase the number of women represented in the legislature¹⁰.

The observation of Table 2 reveals that, despite the incentive of the electoral law for each party to present a large number of candidates, none of the parties investigated competed with lists of all vacancies filled during the last four elections for the Chamber of Deputies. And that number has been decreasing in most of the parties. Among the analyzed party only the PSDB has increased its number of candidates. Regarding this aspect, the quantitative, a leftist party, the PT and the two central parties, PMDB and PSDB, were those who managed to keep the lists with the largest number of entrants over the period analyzed, and from this point of view, the most inclusive.

	Table 2 - Number of candidates to Chamber of Deputies, Brazil (1994-2006)											
	1994			1998			2002			2006		
	Men	Women	TOTAL	Men	Women	TOTAL	Men	Women	TOTAL	Men	Women	TOTAL
PT	89,8	10,2	373	87,8	12,2	328	86,3	13,7	422	87,6	12,3	351
PMDB	94	6	399	87,7	12,3	350	89,1	10,9	322	88,5	11,5	340
PSDB	93,8	6,2	272	90,8	9,2	292	88	12	275	85,1	14,9	308
PFL/DEM	97	3	236	92	8	276	90,9	9,1	230	88,1	11,9	227
PPB/PP	95,9	4,1	172	92,4	7,6	289	94,3	5,7	194	92	8	175
Total candidates from the five parties	93,3 (1.194)	6,7 (86)	1.280	90,0 (1.381)	10,0 (154)	1.535	89,1 (1.285)	10,9 (158)	1.443	87,9 (1.232)	12,1 (169)	1.401
Total number of candidates	93,8 (2.848)	6,2 (188)	3.036	88,8 (3.064)	11,2 (387)	3.451	88,6 (3.806)	11,4 (490)	4.296	87,3 (4.328)	12,7 (628)	4.956

⁹ Of the 27 Brazilian states, 19 have magnitudes below 20.

¹⁰ The policy of Quotas for the women in Brazil was proposed by the then federal deputy Marta Suplicy from the PT in 1995 right after the World Women Conference, in Beijing, China, where its integrants proposed the equality between the sexes in the political power. This law, number 9.100/95, establishes that at least 20% of the vacancies of each party or coalition should be filled by women candidature. Due to the received criticism in 1997, the 9504 law established the reserve of at least 25% of the vacancies and at most 75% for the women in the party's list. This new parameter began in 1998 with the parties reserving normally 30% of the vacancies.

Total number of seats allowed for lists	640	640	640	640
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Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

With regard to the type and profile of candidates from each party list the first important finding is that neither party was able to account for the quota of candidates by gender. The parties studied after three elections, could not expand the representation of women on their lists. What needs to be investigated is to what extent this is due to the lack of incentives of the party itself or from the fact that a relatively small number of women have the ambition to participate in electoral politics. If that is the case check it would be good to the reasons for this disinterest.

In any case, the comparison of the lists shows that since 1994, before the quotas existed, the PT was the party that secured more seats for women. This is followed by the two parties of the center. Only in 2006, the PSDB was the party that had more female candidates. However, in terms of representation in the legislative election results of 2006 elections show that not always having has the largest number of applicant means more electoral success. As can be seen in table 3, despite the PSDB having more women candidates it was the party with the lowest proportion of women elected, followed by PT. But another central party, the PMDB, followed by right-wing parties, PP and PFL/DEM, obtained the highest proportions among candidates and elected officials.

Table 3 – Candidates and Elected to the Chamber of Deputies by Political Party and Gender, 2006

	PFL (%)		PP (%)		PSDB (%)		PMDB (%)		PT (%)		TOTAL (%)	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
Female	11.9	7.7	8.0	7.3	14.9	4.5	11.5	10.1	12.0	8.4	12.0	7.8
Male	88.1	92.3	92.0	92.7	85.1	95.5	88.5	89.9	88.0	91.6	88.0	92.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Database “*Eleições 2006: candidatos ao Poder Legislativo no Brasil*” (Elections 2006: candidates do the Legislative in Brazil) from NUSP – UFPR.

Another important aspect in measuring the above hypothesis concerning the plurality of generations of affiliates to the respective parties is analyzed. According to the information in Table 4 parties whose selectors were classified as the most exclusive parties are the lists of candidates and elected the most comprehensive in this regard. The PT, with the more inclusive selectorate, focused most of their candidates between aged 36 to 55 years. One explanation for this fact is related to

the restructuring of the party system, marked by the continuity of various political groups remaining in periods of earlier politics. That the case of PFL / DEM, PP, PMDB and to a lesser extent, PSDB. Since the PT was organized by political groups further from the practical and political-electoral dynamic and rapid transition to democracy, which resulted in the accession of younger members and less experience in electoral politics (Braga, 2006). But with the continuity of elections since 1982 its members have acquired experience and become professional, with a high degree of permanence in their chosen framework.

Table 4 – Candidates and Elected to the Chamber of Deputies by Political Party and Ages, 2006

Ages	PFL (%)		PP (%)		PSDB (%)		PMDB (%)		PT (%)		TOTAL (%)	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
From 16 to 25 years old	1.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.7	0.0
From 26 to 35 years old	8.8	10.8	10.8	12.2	9.1	6.1	7.9	4.5	9.1	4.8	9.0	7.0
From 36 to 45 years old	24.2	21.5	22.7	9.8	27.5	25.8	22.6	13.5	34.3	22.9	26.9	19.2
From 46 to 55 years old	35.7	32.3	34.1	36.6	34.0	31.8	32.9	33.7	39.7	53.0	35.4	38.1
From 56 to 65 years old	18.1	21.5	22.2	31.7	21.0	22.7	22.4	31.5	16.0	19.3	19.8	25.0
From 66 to 75 years old	10.6	12.3	8.0	7.3	6.1	9.1	10.9	11.2	0.3	0.0	6.8	7.8
From 76 to 85 years old	1.3	1.5	1.7	2.4	1.0	4.5	2.6	4.5	0.0	0.0	1.3	2.6
Older than 86 years old	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.1	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Database "Eleições 2006: candidatos ao Poder Legislativo no Brasil" (Elections 2006: candidates do the Legislative in Brazil) from NUSP – UFPR.

The analysis of the three variables of social background of the candidates supports, at least in part, with Rodrigue's (2002) and Marengo dos Santos & Serna's (2007) results. Tables 5, 6 and 7 show the party lists present on differences between their social bases of selection of their candidates. However, the main distinction is found between the PT and other parties. This is because, amongst other things, the list of PT's candidates includes people with lower educational levels, and has the lowest proportion of aspiring entrepreneurs and high patrimony and none with high net worth. The center parties, especially the PMDB, and the right have a closer social profile. Most of their candidates have high education and medium and high patrimony worth.

Table 5 – Candidates and Elected by Political Party and Scholarship, 2006.

Scholarship	PFL (%)		PP (%)		PSDB (%)		PMDB (%)		PT (%)		TOTAL (%)	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
Read and Write	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.3	1.2	0.1	0.3
Incomplete School	1.3	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.0	1.5	0.9	0.0	2.6	1.2	1.4	0.6
Complete School	2.6	0.0	5.7	4.9	3.6	1.5	5.6	1.1	4.9	2.4	4.5	1.7
High School Incomplete	1.8	0.0	3.4	2.4	1.9	0.0	2.9	1.1	1.7	0.0	2.3	0.6
Complete High School	15.4	12.3	19.9	9.8	12.3	0.0	15.3	9.0	14.9	10.8	15.1	8.4
Incomplete Degree	11.0	7.7	9.7	2.4	9.7	7.6	12.1	6.7	11.4	8.4	10.9	7.0

Complete Degree	67.8	80.0	60.2	80.5	71.5	89.4	63.2	82.0	64.3	75.9	65.7	81.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Database "Eleições 2006: candidatos ao Poder Legislativo no Brasil" (Elections 2006: candidates do the Legislative in Brazil) from NUSP – UFPR.

Table 6 – Candidates and Elected by Political Party and Professions, 2006.

Professions	PFL (%)		PP (%)		PSDB (%)		PMDB (%)		PT (%)		TOTAL (%)	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
Lawyer	13.2	9.2	10.2	8.4	12.3	13.6	10.6	5.6	10.9	8.4	11.4	8.1
Retired (Except Public Server)	0.9	0.0	3.4	0.0	1.0	1.5	1.5	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.4	0.3
Economists and Banking	0.0	0.0	0.6	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	3.7	3.6	1.1	0.9
Trader	1.8	3.1	3.4	0.0	2.6	1.5	4.1	1.1	1.1	0.0	2.6	1.2
Housewife	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0
Businessman	7.0	7.7	11.9	1.2	8.7	3.0	11.5	10.1	1.7	1.2	7.8	6.1
Engineer	4.8	6.2	6.3	1.2	3.2	6.1	3.2	6.7	2.0	1.2	3.6	6.1
Students, trainees and resembled	1.8	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.0	0.0
Industrialist	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
Doctor	4.8	7.7	5.7	9.6	5.5	6.1	3.5	4.5	4.3	9.6	4.6	6.4
Professor of Higher Education	1.5	3.1	1.1	4.8	3.6	0.0	0.9	0.0	4.6	4.8	2.5	2.6
Priest or member of religious sect	0.4	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.5	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.3
Retired Public Server	1.3	0.0	1.7	1.2	1.3	0.0	1.5	0.0	1.4	1.2	1.4	0.3
Arts and Sports	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.2	0.7	0.3
Activity service	1.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.0	1.5	1.1	1.1	0.0	1.1	0.3
Administration and Economics	3.5	3.1	2.8	3.6	4.9	3.0	3.2	4.5	2.6	3.6	3.4	3.2
Public Server	3.1	0.0	4.5	0.0	6.1	3.0	5.6	2.2	8.0	0.0	5.8	1.7
Another degree professions	2.6	3.1	1.1	2.4	3.9	3.0	3.5	2.2	2.9	2.4	3.0	2.3
Civilian Police and Military Police	3.5	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.9	0.0	1.1	0.0
Politician	23.3	43.1	19.3	43.4	16.5	50.0	23.5	51.7	22.9	43.4	21.3	47.7
Agricultural Producer	1.3	1.5	2.8	1.2	1.0	0.0	1.5	1.1	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.5
Health Employee	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.5	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3
Urban Employee	4.8	1.5	4.0	4.8	6.5	0.0	4.7	2.2	5.4	4.8	5.2	2.0
Communication Employee	3.5	4.6	2.8	1.2	2.3	0.0	2.1	1.1	0.6	1.2	2.1	1.7
Education Employee	0.9	0.0	1.7	6.0	2.6	0.0	3.2	1.1	8.9	6.0	3.9	1.7
Rural Sector Employee	0.9	1.5	2.3	1.2	0.6	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.9	1.2	1.1	0.6
Retired Military	1.3	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3
Another professions	11.5	4.6	9.1	4.8	12.6	4.5	9.7	3.4	11.7	4.8	11.0	3.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Database "Eleições 2006: candidatos ao Poder Legislativo no Brasil" (Elections 2006: candidates do the Legislative in Brazil) from NUSP – UFPR.

Table 7 – Candidates and Elected by Political Party and Heritage, 2006.

Heritage	PFL (%)		PP (%)		PSDB (%)		PMDB (%)		PT (%)		TOTAL (%)	
	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected	Candidates	Elected
None	15.4	3.1	17.6	2.4	21.0	9.1	16.5	4.5	18.9	8.4	18.0	5.8
Really Low	4.0	1.5	5.1	2.4	1.0	1.5	2.4	1.1	6.3	1.2	3.6	1.2
Low	13.2	0.0	11.9	0.0	18.4	3.0	17.4	5.6	24.9	13.3	18.1	5.5
Medium/Low	9.7	9.2	10.8	2.4	7.4	3.0	9.1	4.5	20.6	28.9	11.9	10.8
Medium	16.7	13.8	22.7	29.3	22.7	18.2	15.9	18.0	17.4	30.1	18.8	21.5
Medium / High	11.9	15.4	12.5	17.1	15.2	33.3	17.6	27.0	7.4	10.8	13.0	20.9
High	28.2	55.4	15.9	36.6	13.3	30.3	19.1	34.8	4.3	7.2	15.2	31.4
Really High	0.4	1.5	2.8	9.8	0.3	0.0	1.2	2.2	0.3	0.0	0.9	2.0
Extreme High	0.4	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.6	1.5	0.9	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Database “Eleições 2006: candidatos ao Poder Legislativo no Brasil” (Elections 2006: candidates do the Legislative in Brazil) from NUSP – UFPR.

These evidence, therefore, is consistent with the hypothesis about the consequences of the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate of the parties in the formation of party lists and, consequently, in its representation of Legislative. The more degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate of the PT, which in turn is related to the type of formation and internal organization, is turning into a more pluralistic party list on the social profile of the candidates presented, therefore, as already shown in Rodrigues (2002), there has been a higher degree of democratization of access to the spheres of power in the Brazilian political system.

Although with the important distinction found, it is valid that the process of democratization of access to political arenas in Brazil, to some degree, involves parties of the center and right, especially considering the patterns of occupation of the candidate. Table 6 shows that the parties, despite their ideological differences, have a similar social diversity of candidates. A comparison of the lists reveals that its organizers have tried to choose candidates for specific sectors of society, leaders of social movements and trade unions or individuals for specific activities. It is noteworthy in this regard, that there is a similarity of the proportion of *urban workers* in each party list among all parties. While the PSDB candidates in that category account for 6.5% of the entire list, the PT falls to 5.4%, the PFL/DEM and PMDB were almost the same proportion 4.8% and 4.7% respectively. The PP has the lowest ratio, 4%.

More crucial evidence of the similarity of these parties is found from the comparison of party lists, regarding the degree of professionalization of candidates

assessed by the category of candidates who claim to be *political*. In all party lists analyzed in this category this category is the one with the highest proportion of candidates. In this regard the more professional parties are the PMDB (23.5%), followed closely by the PFL / DEM (23%), the PT (22.9%), the PP (19 %) and finally the PSDB (16.5%). An explanation for this finding is the particular nature of political parties and their institutionalization. As stated by Panebianco (1982), only the political parties as organizations working in the electoral arena in search of votes can reproduce in the Legislature, according to Katz (2001), through the process of selecting their candidates. But the dynamics of the representative process require a wide range of political capital, economic resources, policy and technical information campaigns and experience in legislative work. There is therefore a need for increased professionalization of those members who aspire to run for any elective office. In this context, and due to the high degree of competitiveness of the contests for the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil, the next section will illustrate how the party leadership is controlling the number of competitive candidates in their lists of candidates to reduce the unpredictability of its electoral success. This will be the aim of the next section.

IV. Consequences of control of candidate selection process by party leaders in electoral competition

Parties seek electoral success. To achieve this goal, the process of selection of candidates is one of the crucial activities of any political party in contemporary democracies. In the case of Brazil the hypothesis is that party leaders control the lists of candidates in order to ensure those candidates' electoral success. For this, the parties act strategically in the selection and formation of the candidate list by adopting criteria that contribute both to the avoidance of intra-party competition on the one hand, and the reduction of uncertainties related to its electoral success in any dispute between the parties keeping the number of competitive candidates under control, on the other hand. For this, the selectorate of each party selects candidates according to two criteria. One is the *geographical* criteria, controlling the number of competitive applicants from each region of the state. Another is the *sector*, i.e., choosing candidates who stand out in specific sectors of the electorate (social movement activists, professional and business, religious leaders, athletes,

and others). This paper verifies only the first part of this hypothesis because the database of this research is still being systematized.

To assess this hypothesis first will be checked the traditional notion supported by the literature that the electoral law creates incentives for parties to launch (lancer) a large number of competitive candidates to maximize their electoral results. For this the numbers of candidates for each party list will be checked in two Brazilian states: São Paulo and Rio Grande do Norte. The selection of these states is due to the size of their electoral magnitudes and the socioeconomic characteristics being very different. The first represents the largest constituency, with seventy seats in the Chambers of Deputies and the largest GDP of Brazil. The second is located among the states with the lowest magnitudes, with 9 seats, and one of the lowest GDP rates.

Secondly the number of competitive or viable candidates released by the parties in recent elections will be examined. The viable candidates will be defined according to Rahat & Hazan (2001). For them the parties' resort to past performance to resolve which the safest positions in the list are. This is the case with the closed list system but in the open list system such as in Brazil, it is crucial to check the electoral potential and the distribution pattern of electoral support received by each candidate in the last election. The viable candidates are those who obtained a number of votes closest to the number of votes achieved by the last candidate elected in the previous election. In the cases studied we consider viable candidates who received at least 70% of the votes of the last candidate elected by the same party. The next step will be to classify and identify the number and the types of candidates in accordance with their degree of competitiveness in each party list.

Thirdly we will identify the regions that support each type of viable candidate classified, when the geographic criteria are discussed and demonstrated, used by party leaders to avoid the overlapping of candidates and, consequently, the intra list competition and at the same time enhancing the chances of greater electoral success.

I. The party list concentration

In the conventional description, as discussed in the section above, Brazil's electoral system is criticized for promoting the reputation of individual politicians to the detriment of the party organization, resulting in weak political parties. One of the

aspects emphasized in this description is that the electoral law allows parties to present a lot of competitive candidates in proportional elections to increase their electoral success (Lamounier, 1989, 1992, Mainwaring, 1991; Kinzo, 1993). One effect of the high number of candidates would be the reduction of control over the election by party leaders, because of the increasing importance of individual efforts in the campaign.

However, as the information in Tables 8 and 9 below shows the evidence goes in another direction. In both the states of São Paulo and Rio Grande do Norte, from 1994 to 2006, no party studied reached the limit of 1.5 times the number of seats in dispute¹¹, even with every alleged incentive in the electoral law.

In Table 8 we can observe that the parties were well below the legal limit of 105 candidates in the state of Sao Paulo. In all elections the number of candidates in each party list was even below the magnitude of 70 seats. Another important finding is that, until the 2002 elections, there was a clear reduction in the number of candidates in most of the party lists. The only exception was the PT. In subsequent elections, the PFL/DEM and the PSDB returned to the initial level for the series examined here. A possible explanation for this increase is related to the fact that both parties are together in opposition to the federal government, while they are partners, and control São Paulo's state government and the city.

Table 8 - Number of Candidates for Chamber of Deputies in the 1994-2006 elections in the state of São Paulo

	1994	1998	2002	2006
PPB/PPR/PP	65	50	33	33
PFL/DEM	36	25	17	36
PMDB	62	49	31	39
PSDB	67	50	42	67
PT	48	45	59	58
Other parties	247	442	542	721
maximum number of seats allowed*	105	105	105	105

Source: Prepared using data from the Tribunal Superior (TSE)

*without coalition

In the state of Rio Grande do Norte a similar pattern was observed, albeit of a much smaller magnitude due to the district. According to Table 9, it appears that only

¹¹ In the case of Sao Paulo each party, not coalition, could provide up to 105 candidates for Congress and Rio Grande do Norte to 12.

the PT in the election of 1998 showed the number of candidates allowed by law to be 12. And most of the party lists were also below the magnitude of 8 seats. The only exception was again the PT, with 11 candidates in 2002. An examination of each party reveals that while the PFL/DEM, PSDB and the PT decreased by half from the party lists for elections in 1994 and 2006, the PMDB was a slight increase and the PP remained almost stable during this period.

Table 9. Number of Candidates for Chamber of Deputies which launched the 1994-2006 elections for the state of Rio Grande do Norte

	1994	1998	2002	2006
PP/PPB/PPR	02	04	03	03
PFL/ DEM	07	04	04	03
PMDB	04	05	06	06
PSDB	06	04	02	03
PT	06	12	11	03
Other parties	14	18	49	50
maximum number of seats allowed*	12	12	12	12

Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

*without coalition

The evidence reviewed (on the number of candidates from party lists in two districts of differing magnitudes) suggests that the selection process is not as open as claimed by Mainwaring (1999) and Samuels (2004), and unlike the increase, confirming the findings of Samuels for the 2002 elections, the greatest downward trend of the candidates in most of the parties in two states is investigated.

The next step will be to examine if in fact the party leaders control the number of competitive candidates for geographic regions to reduce domestic competition and thus increase the chances of electoral success for these candidates. We start from the assumption that for the maximum shares for their votes to reach the electoral quotient, their leaders must act strategically focusing their efforts on those electorally competitive candidates who have the greatest chance of reaching the party quotient. To verify this hypothesis we classify the candidates of each party list in elections in 2002 and 2006, following the intuition of Rahat & Hazan (2001). The viable candidates will be those who received at least 70% of the votes of the last candidate elected by the same party in the previous election. So the unviable candidates are those who have not reached that threshold. Among the viable candidates, the

candidates who will be considered "good vote" are those members who have achieved 50 to 90% of the electoral quotient and the super candidates "who have obtained 90% or more of the electoral quotient for each election.

The first important finding in the election compared in two contexts is that most of the congressional candidates did not reach the level of electoral viability (number of votes required to elect the last candidate in the previous election). These unviable candidates add a certain amount of votes to the party, but less than viable candidate in both states analyzed. Therefore, the second key finding is that there are few candidates who may have autonomous behavior in relation to the party, because among the viable candidates, those classified as "good votes" and "super candidates" (voted with more than the electoral quotient) are the minority in both states.

According to Table 10 we see that the number of candidates considered viable in all parties who participated in the elections of 2002 and 2006 is much smaller than the total number of candidates presented. In 2002, the ratio of viable candidates and the total of candidates was 22.7%, increasing to 32% in 2006. This number is even lower when we observe the number of "good candidates" and the "super candidates" in relation to all candidates. At the same time the parties maintain a certain amount of regularity in these kinds of competitive candidates from one election to another, especially among those classified as "super candidates", that is, those candidates who obtained more votes than the electoral quotient, and therefore do not depend on parties to get themselves elected. While in 2002 the party lists had 1.3% of candidates with "super voting", in 2006 this figure represented less than 1% of candidates. Among the "good candidates", those who depend on, even to a lesser extent, in the total vote of the party, there was a greater fluctuation, ranging from 4.5% in 2002 to 2.5% in 2006.

Table 10 - Number of Applicants by types and elections 2002-2006 (São Paulo)

	Super Candidate	Good voting	Viable	Nonviable	Total
2002	09	32	161	608	709
2006	09	25	320	676	996

Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

The examination of the quantity of each type of candidate per party in Table 11 also shows that the “super candidates” in the 2002 elections, were mostly in the five largest parties in the state of São Paulo. This did not occur in the 2006 elections. In 2002 the PT was the party which had the largest number of such candidates but in 2006 it was the PSDB, followed by the PP. It should also be noted that in the 2006 elections the PT, PFL / DEM and the PMDB had no candidates in this category, and also considerably increased the number of viable candidates, which are more dependent on the party vote to get them elected. This implies, at least theoretically, the largest parliamentary ties, in terms of party discipline, to the party in which the candidates were elected.

Table 11- Number of Applicants by types, party and elections 2002-2006 (São Paulo)

	PP			PFL/DEM			PMDB			PSDB			PT		
	S*	G	V	S	G	V	S	G	V	S	G	V	S	G	V
2002	01	01	02	01	04	05	01	04	05	01	09	15	03	11	11
2006	02	0	06	0	03	24	0	0	15	03	11	34	0	07	41

Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

*S = super candidate G = good voting V = viable

In Rio Grande do Norte Table 12 shows a similar pattern to that found in São Paulo when we consider the small number of viable candidates in all parties who participated in that election, but unlike São Paulo, the quota has decreased from one election to another. While in 2002 the competitive candidates represented 31% of all candidates, in 2006 this share fell to 13%. However, in the two types of more competitive candidates remained relatively stable percentages, particularly in the proportion of super candidates (2.7% and 3% respectively), as observed in São Paulo.

Table 12 - Number of Applicants by types, party and elections in 2002-2006 (RN)

	Super Candidate	Good voting	Viable	Nonviable	Total
2002	02	07	26	48	74
2006	02	05	9	59	68

Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

With regard to the number of candidates per party, in the same election, we find that in Rio Grande do Norte the "super candidates" and "good votes" are distributed only among the four parties examined: PFL / DEM, PP, PMDB and PT.

The PSDB, even in coalition, won the vote at well below the level of electoral viability, not electing any candidate in the two elections analyzed.

Table 13 - Number of Applicants by types, party and elections in 2002-2006 (RN)

	PP			PFL/DEM			PMDB			PSDB			PT		
	S	G	V	S	G	V	S	G	V	S	G	V	S	G	V
2002	0	2	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0
2006	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

*S = super candidate G = good voting V = viable

As party leaders control the number of competitive candidates submitted, their lists in the proportional elections, in Tables 14 and 15 demonstrate how this control is also given as the territorial distribution of applications¹². To analyze this last point, related to the effect of selection of candidates on party competition, we will focus on the election results obtained by the parties studied in the 2006 elections.

In São Paulo the leaders of five parties, to some extent, select those candidates in various regions. With this strategy, they seek to avoid internal competition and at the same time, seek to ensure a greater degree of electoral success by broadening their bases of support. The PSDB is the party which has the greatest control of application and geographic region, thus avoiding what their own leaders call the process of “internal cannibalism”, that is, there is dispute between their own candidates in the same geographic al areas.

However, it appears that among the four parties examined they concentrate most of their viable candidates in most geographic al regions of the state, and the capital of São Paulo. The PT is followed by the PSDB and the PFL/DEM and PMDB still have more than 65% of theirs staff resulting from this competitive region. One explanation for this high concentration has to do with the size of the electorate in São Paulo, the largest in the country. Due to the high diversity of the electorate paulistano party, leaders distribute their candidates taking in this case, the various types of sectors of the population and social movements. But to verify this hypothesis further empirical evidence and methodological procedures are needed, which will be investigated in the future work.

¹²¹² To check the number of applications for the territorial dimension were examined votes per candidate and regional division proposed by IBGE. The state of São Paulo is divided into 15 regions and Rio Grande do Norte in 4.

Table 14 – Number of Candidate by types, party and geographic region (São Paulo, 2006)

Region	Types of candidate	Party				
		PP	PFL,DEM	PMDB	PSDB	PT
Araçatuba	S					
	G					
	V	1	1			1
Araraquara	S					
	G					
	V		2		1	
Assis	S					
	G					
	V				1	
Baixada Santista	S					
	G					
	V	1	1		2	2
Bauru	S					
	G					
	V		2	2	1	2
Campinas	S				1	
	G				3	
	V		2		3	3
Itapetininga	S					
	G					
	V					
Litoral Sul Paulista	S					
	G					
	V			1	2	
Macro Metropolitana Paulista	S					
	G				1	
	V			1	2	2
Marília	S					
	G					
	V				1	
Piracicaba	S					
	G				1	
	V					3
Presidente Prudente	S					
	G					
	V		1	1	1	
Ribeirão Preto	S					
	G					1
	V		1		1	1
São José do Rio Preto	S					
	G				1	
	V	1		1	1	
São Paulo	S	2			1	
	G		3		5	6
	V	3	11	8	18	25
Vale do Paraíba Paulista	S				1	
	G					
	V		2	1		2

Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

*S = super candidate G = good voting V = viable

In the state of Rio Grande do Norte party leaders focus their competitive candidates in two geographical regions, which are the largest in population. There is a more equitable distribution among the viable candidates of each party and these two regions, resulting in areas of greater competition between the parties.

Table 15 - Number of Candidate by types, party and geographic region (RN, 2006)

Region	Types of Candidate	Party				
		PP	PFL,DEM	PMDB	PSDB	PT
Agreste Potiguar	S*					
	G					
	V					
Central Potiguar	S					
	G					
	V					
Leste Potiguar	S		1	1		
	G					1
	V					
Oeste Potiguar	S			2		
	G	1	1			
	V					

Source: Prepared using data from the TSE.

*S = super candidate G = good voting V = viable

This evidence shows that the parties investigated, regardless of the magnitude of the constituency, act strategically in controlling the number of applicants by competitive region in each subsystem party. The result of this strategy is important to the party leadership election to minimize the uncertainty and thus ensure their survival in a highly competitive market as in Brazil. The success of this strategy in the electoral arena, in turn, allows certain leaders (or political groups) to keep the stability of the party's organizational structure under control and therefore the conduct of the line of authority within each party.

We also saw that the parties still have great disparity in performance of an electoral constituency each other. The PSDB is a noteworthy case. Although it is one of the biggest parties in the state of São Paulo, in Rio Grande Norte their electoral strategies did not help to achieve a viable level of votes.

V - Conclusions

With the increasing concern over the micro-processes of democracy in Latin America and the recognition that institutions alone are insufficient to explain political behavior, the steps and procedures of political recruitment are becoming crucial to understanding the functioning, maintenance, and governability of regimes. The aim of this paper was to investigate the consequences of the legislative candidate

selection process for the Brazilian political representation system. For this, the degree of intraparty inclusiveness was analyzed. Then the control of party lists by party leaders was examined.

The analysis of the degree of intraparty democracy showed that the principal parties in Brazil present different types of the selectorate in conducting the selection process of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies. And this procedure has implications for the degree of inclusiveness of political groups in party decisions. Another important finding is that Brazilian parties occupy different positions in the spectrum of political ideology when evaluating the type of selectorate by the degree of participation of its members in selecting their candidates.

It was demonstrated that in the case of the parties of the right, PP and the PFL/DEM, party leaders indicate the names of prospective candidates and the list formed is presented to a convention. At an intermediate level are found the two parties of the center. In the PMDB and the PSDB, the executive of their state directory decides that who selects candidates. In this case the delegates of both parties participate by voting on the list at the state convention. In some state conventions the party members may be asked to express themselves through the vote, compared with other issues which important to the strategies of the party during election campaigns. It can also be seen that the PT is the most inclusive party, including a larger number of militants of the party machine and their tendencies in the selection process.

With the position of the selectorate of each party in the continuum of inclusiveness in mind, the next step was to verify the relationship between these types of selectors and the social profile of each party list.

With regard to the type and profile of candidates from each party list the first important finding is that no party was able to meet the quota for female candidates. After three elections, the parties could not expand the representation of women on their lists. What needs to be investigated is to what extent this is due to the lack of incentives within the party itself or from the fact that a relatively small number of women have the ambition to participate in electoral politics. If the latter is the case it would be good to check the reasons for this lack of interest. In any case, the comparison of the lists shows that since 1994, before the quotas existed, the PT was the party that secured the most seats for women. This is followed by the two parties of the centre. Only in 2006 was the PSDB the party that had the most female

candidates. However, in terms of representation in the legislative election, the results of the 2006 elections show that having the largest number of candidates does not necessarily translate into more electoral success.

In relation to generations in each party, it was seen that most of the candidates in the PT were between the ages of 36 to 55 years. The centre and right parties show a greater variation in age of their candidates, with more concentration in the age range of 46 to 65. The exception is the PFL, with from more candidates in the 36 to 46 age range.

The analysis of the three variables in the social background of the candidates showed that the party lists present differences between the social bases of selection of their candidates. However, the main distinction is found between the PT and other parties. This is because, among other things, the list of the PT's candidates includes people with lower educational levels, and has the lowest proportion of aspiring entrepreneurs and high patrimony and none with high net worth. The centre parties, especially the PMDB, and the right have a more homeogenous social profile. Most of their candidates have high education and medium and high patrimony.

This evidence, therefore, is consistent with the hypothesis about the consequences of the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate of the parties in the formation of party lists and, consequently, in its legislative representation. The high degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate of the PT is related to the type of party formation and internal organization, and results in a more pluralistic party list when it comes to the social profile of the candidates presented. Therefore, as already shown in Rodrigues (2002), the PT has contributed the democratization of access to the spheres of power in the Brazilian political system.

Although with the important distinction found, we have also seen that the process of democratization of access to political arenas in Brazil, to some degree, involves parties of the centre and right. One explanation for this fact is that despite their ideological differences, there is a certain social diversity in their candidates. A comparison of the lists revealed that its organizers have tried to choose candidates from specific sectors of society, such as leaders of social movements and trade unions or individuals with specific professional backgrounds.

However, crucial evidence of the similarity of these parties is found in the comparison of party lists, regarding the degree of professionalization of candidates

assessed by the category of candidates who claim to be *political*. In all party lists analyzed, this category is the one with the highest proportion of candidates. In this regard the more professional parties are the PMDB (23.5%), followed closely by the PFL / DEM (23%), the PT (22.9%), the PP (19 %) and finally the PSDB (16.5%). An explanation for this finding is the particular nature of political parties and their institutionalization. As stated by Panebianco (1982) only the political parties as organizations working in the electoral arena in search of votes can reproduce in the Legislature, according to Katz (2001), through the process of selecting their candidates. But the dynamics of the representative process require a wide range of political capital, economic resources, policy and technical information and experience in legislative work. There is therefore a need for increased professionalization of those members who aspire to run for any elective office. In this context and due to the high degree of competitiveness of the contests for the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil, the party leadership is controlling the number of competitive candidates in their lists in order to reduce the unpredictability of its electoral success.

The party leadership is controlling the number of competitive candidates in their lists of candidates in two ways. First, they present a number of viable candidates lower than the magnitude of the district. This was shown in the two states examined. Second, their leaders avoid candidates who will compete in the same geographical area, thus reducing the competition between candidates of the same party.

VI. References

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